The Pink Panther Meets the Grim Reaper: Estate Taxation of the Fruits of Crime by Turnier, William J.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 72 | Number 1 Article 7
11-1-1993
The Pink Panther Meets the Grim Reaper: Estate
Taxation of the Fruits of Crime
William J. Turnier
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina
Law Review by an authorized administrator of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
William J. Turnier, The Pink Panther Meets the Grim Reaper: Estate Taxation of the Fruits of Crime, 72 N.C. L. Rev. 163 (1993).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol72/iss1/7
THE PINK PANTHER MEETS THE GRIM REAPER:
ESTATE TAXATION OF THE FRUITS OF CRIME
WILLIAM J. TURNIER*
Historically, scholars, courts, and the IRS have paid scant
attention to the proper estate tax treatment of the fruits of crimi-
nal activity. This era has reached its end, however, with two re-
cent determinations by the IRS that such property is to be
included in a decedent-criminal's estate.
In this Article, Professor Turnier examines the position taken
by the IRS regarding the estate taxation of stolen or contraband
property, and evaluates the Service's treatment of the issues of
includibility, valuation, and deductions based on forfeiture of the
property or claims against the estate. While agreeing with the
IRS that both property law and income tax law support in-
cludibility, Professor Turnier argues that value should be deter-
mined by the market in which the possessor would have sold the
stolen or contraband goods, regardless of whether this results in
the inclusion of the items' "highest value." Finally, Professor
Turnier addresses the issue of deductibility, concluding that in
many such cases decedents' estates should be allowed a deduc-
tion for forfeitures or claims against the estate.
"I hope they're going to pay taxes on all that money just like
you and me would have to."1
Two recent technical advice memoranda2 have focused attention on
the issue of the appropriate estate tax treatment of property that is the fruit
* Mangum Professor of Law, University of North Carolina School of Law. B.S. 1963,
Fordham University; M.A. 1967, Pennsylvania State University; LL.B. 1968, University of Vir-
ginia. Member of the New York Bar. This article was made possible in part with the assistance of
a grant from the Law Center of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. The author
wishes to thank Louis D. Bilionis and Lawrence A. Zelenak, who read an earlier draft and pro-
vided many useful comments. In addition, Robert Davis and David Spanjer, third-year law stu-
dents at the University of North Carolina Law School, provided invaluable assistance. Needless
to say, all responsibility for any shortcomings rests with the author.
1. William H. Honan, Quedlinburg Treasures Are on View in Dallas, N.Y. TuMis, Mar. 9,
1992, at C11 (quoting Mary Lou Thrasher, visitor at museum exhibit of the Quedlinburg treasure).
2. Technical advice is guidance furnished by the IRS National Office to one of its regional
offices regarding the proper handling of a question that arises during an examination of a tax-
payer. MIcHAEL . SALTMAN, IRS PRAcncE Am PROCEDuar 3.04[21[a] (2d ed. 1991). Tech-
nical advice is particularly useful where the issue in question has been handled inconsistently or is
unusually complex. Id. I 3.04[2][b]. The issuance of technical advice thus enables the IRS to
maintain consistency among its regional offices. Id. J 3.04[2][a].
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of criminal activity. The issue of the income tax treatment of illegal income
is reasonably well resolved, having received substantial scrutiny from the
courts, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), and scholars.' Until recently,
however, the estate tax treatment of such property has been largely ignored.
During the fall of 1991, within a period of less than two months, the IRS
issued two extensive technical advice memoranda (TAM) dealing with the
treatment of property that was the fruit of criminal activity. Technical Ad-
vice Memorandum 91-52-0054 concerns stolen property and TAM
92-07-0041 deals with illegal drugs held by the deceased at death. This
article will analyze and comment on the positions taken by the IRS in both
of these TAM.
Both technical advice memoranda address three basic issues: (1)
whether property that is the fruit of criminal activity is includible in the
estate; (2) if includible, what value is properly includible; and (3) whether a
deduction should be allowed the estate if such property is either recoverable
by the true owner or confiscated by the state. This article will first discuss
each of the TAM6 and will then analyze the Internal Revenue Service's
suggested treatment of each of these three main issues.7 Because much of
the authority in the area of the appropriate tax treatment of fruits of criminal
activity is in the income tax area, considerable resort will be made to in-
come tax authorities, although useful estate tax and property law authorities
also will be discussed.
I. THE RECENT DECISIONS
A. TAM 91-52-005: Stolen Property
Technical Advice Memorandum 91-52-005, dealing with the estate tax
treatment of stolen property, presents an extremely interesting set of facts
The effect of technical advice is somewhat limited, in that it applies only to the taxpayer for
whom advice was requested. Rev. Proc. 93-2, 1993-1 I.R.B. 50, 65. As a practical matter, the
regional office is bound to follow the National Office's advice and to apply it retroactively.
SALTzmAN, supra, 3.04[2][d]. Exceptions to the retroactivity rule exist, however, where such
application would be unfair to the taxpayer. Id.
For the current IRS release concerning technical advice, see Rev. Proc. 93-2, supra. Tradi-
tionally, the IRS has updated its rules regarding technical advice annually, as the second revenue
procedure of the year.
3. See infra notes 99-111 and accompanying text.
4. Tech. Adv. Mem. 91-52-005 (Aug. 30, 1991) [hereinafter TAM 91-52-005].
5. Tech. Adv. Mem. 92-07-004 (Oct. 21, 1991) [hereinafter TAM 92-07-004].
6. See infra notes 8-48 (discussing TAM 91-52-005), 49-71 (discussing TAM 92-07-004)
and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 72-126 (analyzing includibility), 127-80 (analyzing valuation), 181-257
(analyzing deductibility) and accompanying text.
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involving the theft of the famed Quedlinburg treasures.' The deceased, Jo-
seph T. Meador, while serving as a member of the United States military
during World War II, successfully stole a number of works of art from the
treasury of the Quedlinburg church in the German province of Sax-
ony-Anhalt.9 He mailed these objects to himself at his home address in
Whitewright, Texas, then moved on to France to continue his looting of
Western European culture.10 While in France, Meador also stole several
pieces of valuable silverware and china. When his activities were discov-
ered, he was court-martialed and discharged from the military."
After returning to Whitewright, Meador supported himself as an ele-
mentary school teacher and as a manager of the family hardware store. Yet,
he lived far beyond the station of a school teacher or small town merchant,
acquiring significant interest in exotic plants and birds. He ultimately accu-
mulated a greenhouse complex full of rare plants, which appears to have
been worth more than $2.4 million shortly before his death.12
At Meador's death in 1980 he, by will, left all his silver, china, and
crystal to a nephew and two nieces, bequeathing the remainder of his prop-
erty to his sister and brother. One month after Meador's death, his will was
presented for probate. No estate tax was filed because the estate only listed
assets worth approximately $105,000 and a life insurance policy worth
$15,000.11 A Texas inheritance tax return filed in late 1980 listed these
assets and showed a note for $2727 to a local bank as the only claim against
8. The saga of the Quedlinburg treasure has been covered extensively in the international
and national press. The following is a sampling of some of the best stories about it: Ian Ball, GI's
Looted Treasure Returned, THE DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), May 2, 1990, Int'l Section, at 3;
William H. Honan, A Trove ofMedievalArt Turns Up in Texas, N.Y. TimEs, June 14, 1990, at Al;
William H. Honan, Bank in Texas Admits It Has Missing German Art Treasures, N.Y. Tmrns,
June 19, 1990, at C18; William H. Honan, Deal on Stolen German Art Meets with Mixed Reac-
tion, N.Y. Tnmas, Jan. 9, 1991, at C13; William H. Honan, Inventory in Texas Case Turns Up New
Works, N.Y. Tamms, June 25, 1990, at C14; William H. Honan, It's Finally Agreed: Germany to
Regain a Stolen Trove, N.Y. Tirms, Feb. 26, 1992, at C15; William H. Honan, New Facts and
Lawsuits in the Tale of Art Thefts fror German Church, N.Y. Tnvms, Sept. 10, 1990, at C15
[hereinafter Honan, New Facts]; William H. Honan, Stolen Treasure: Three Stories, N.Y. Trams,
June 30, 1990, § 1, at 11; I.R.S. Rules on Estate of Stolen Treasures, N.Y. Tamas, Jan. 10, 1992, at
C12; Jo Ann Lewis, On the Trail of Stolen Treasures; The Historian and the Quedlinburg Cache,
WASH. POST, July 11, 1990, at C1 [hereinafter Lewis, Stolen Treasures]; Jo Ann Lewis, Texans to
Return German Treasure, WASH. POST, Jan. 8, 1991, at B1; Relatives of Nimble-Fingered GI
Return Treasure to Germany, C. TRm., May 3, 1992, at C24; Stiftskirche-Domgemeinde of
Quedlinburg v. Jack Meador, et. al., TExhs LAw., Mar. 2, 1992, at 24.
9. J. Michael Kennedy, German WWII Cache May Be In Texas Bank, L.A. TIMEs, June 15,
1990, at A16.
10. TAM 91-52-005, supra note 4, at 16,854.
11. Id.
12. Id.; Honan, New Facts, supra note 8, at C15-C16.
13. Meador, who was single, died of prostate cancer in 1980. During his hospitalization, all
of his rare plants apparently died from lack of attention during a freeze in 1979. This explains
1993]
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the estate. The assets listed on the estate inventory and on the Texas inheri-
tance tax return consisted solely of real estate, stock, and the above men-
tioned life insurance policy. No mention was made of any of the works of
art that were apparently still in the possession of Meador's estate. Some
property held by the estate was distributed to his heirs in 1981, and the
balance was distributed in early 1983. Shortly thereafter, the decedent's
brother and sister obtained the services of an appraiser to examine the
works of art. Meador's brother and an agent attempted first to sell some of
the art objects in the legitimate art market.14
During the course of this effort, Meador's brother and sister were in-
formed by individuals whom they contacted that the property in question
had been stolen. 5 They then moved some of the art works, consisting of
ancient manuscripts, to Switzerland, and placed them in a safe deposit box.
Meador's siblings next attempted to sell the manuscripts in the illicit art
market. 6 The entire Quedlinburg treasure in possession of Meador's heirs
was recently estimated to be worth between $50 million and $100 million 17
in the legitimate art market; a single manuscript, a ninth-century illuminated
gospel, was worth $9 million in the legitimate art market. Nevertheless, it
and several other lesser items would bring only $3 million in the illicit art
market. 18
Acting in part on the basis of information regarding these attempted
sales, a free-lance detective traced the transactions down to their origin in
Texas. The Quedlinburg church then commenced legal action to retrieve its
property.' 9 When inventories were taken of various safe deposit boxes held
in the name of the decedent's heirs, many of the works of art stolen from
the Quedlinburg church were discovered. In addition, officials found a
number of other works of art, which were most likely stolen from individu-
als and institutions in France and Germany. To date, no other individuals or
organizations have come forward to claim these items.2" The Quedlinburg
their exclusion from a listing of assets in Meador's estate. See TAM 91-52-005, supra note 4, at
16,854-55; Honan, New Facts, supra note 8, at C16.
14. TAM 91-52-005, supra note 4, at 16,855-56.
15. Il at 16,855.
16. Id. at 16,856. For intriguing discussions of the stolen art market, see BoNaE BuRHAM,
ART TBEr: ITs ScoPE, Irs IMPACT, AND ITS CONTROL (1978); Charles Koczka, A Special Agent
Speaks Out, ART & ANrnQuEs, Nov. 1986, at 59; Carl Nagin, The Politics of Plunder, NEw ART
ExAIaNER, Nov. 1986, at 22.
17. See LR.S. Rules on Estate of Stolen Treasures, supra note 8, at C12 (estimating $100
million value); Lewis, Stolen Treasures, supra note 8, at Cl, C4 (estimating $50 million value).
18. See TAM 91-52-005, supra note 4, at 16,856.
19. Id. Although the Quedlinburg church had conducted an extensive investigation to deter-
mine the whereabouts of the stolen art work, it was never able to learn anything about the property
during Meador's lifetime. Lewis, Stolen Treasures, supra note 8, at Cl, C4.
20. TAM 91-52-005, supra note 4, at 16,586.
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church and a German cultural foundation eventually agreed to pay Mea-
dor's heirs a "finder's fee" of $2.75 million for the return of the entire
Quedlinburg treasure. 21
In TAM 91-52-005 the IRS ruled that the stolen works of art Meador
held at his death were includible in his estate.22 The IRS noted that, in
determining whether property should be included in the estate, it had been
concerned principally with the "economic equivalen[ce] of ownership
rather than.., possession of technical legal title."'23 Even if Meador lacked
technical legal title, as long as he possessed the use and economic benefits
of the property and was able successfully to transfer them to his heirs, the
IRS indicated that the property should be included in the deceased's gross
estate under § 2033 of the Internal Revenue Code (the Code). 4 In so hold-
ing, the IRS stressed the fact that the deceased apparently had successfully
sold a portion of the stolen art work to support his lifestyle, and that his
heirs apparently had attempted to dispose of the remaining art objects for
their own profit.25
The IRS also noted that, under Texas law, the decedent and his heirs
possessed rights to the property that were superior to those of all parties
other than its true owners.2 6 For example, if any party other than the true
owner lay claim to one of the art objects, a Texas court would undoubtedly
conclude that the art object should be retained by the decedent or his
heirs.27
In resolving the issue of includibility of the property in the estate of the
deceased, the IRS was influenced largely by James v. United States,2" an
income tax case in which a thief who did not have good legal title to prop-
erty was nonetheless required to treat the stolen property as income for tax
purposes.29 The IRS similarly concluded that, for estate tax purposes, the
includibility of such property should not be based on whether the posses-
sor-thief had colorable legal title to the property in question.30 If, at his
death, the decedent-thief possessed the use of, and derived economic bene-
fit from stolen property to the same extent as an owner, the IRS concluded
21. Honan, It's Finally Agreed: Germany to Regain a Stolen Trove, supra note 8, at C15;
Lewis, Texans to Return German Treasure, supra note 8, at B1.
22. TAM 91-52-005, supra note 4, at 16,859.
23. Id. at 16,857.
24. Id. at 16,858.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. 366 U.S. 213 (1961).
29. TAM 91-52-005, supra note 4, at 16,858-59.
30. Id. at 16,859.
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that the property in question should be included in his estate.31 The IRS
distinguished Estate of Bluestein,32 in which the Tax Court ruled that mis-
appropriated property held by the deceased, which was returned to its right-
ful owner immediately after death and during the course of administration
of the estate, was not includible within the deceased's estate.33 The IRS
contrasted that factual situation with the present one, in which the heirs of
the deceased held the property for their use and enjoyment, and attempted
to exercise complete dominion and control over the property for more than
a decade.34
The second issue dealt with by the IRS in TAM 91-52-005 was the
proper valuation of the stolen art work.35 The IRS recognized that two
distinct markets exist for art work, the legal market and the illicit market.
In general, stolen property is virtually unsellable in the legal market and
consequently has little or no value. In the illicit market, however, such art
work typically has considerable realizable value, which, given proper cir-
cumstances, could constitute a significant percentage of the value that it
would have were it not stolen.3 6
In determining value, the IRS analogized from a number of income tax
cases in which the IRS reconstructed the income of drug dealers based on
the illegal market value of the narcotics that the dealers had possessed and
disposed of during the course of the year.37 The IRS apparently felt addi-
tionally justified in considering the illicit market value for works of art be-
cause of the decedent's successful disposal of many of the stolen art objects
in this market, as well as his heirs' attempts to do the same.3 1
To buttress its position, the IRS assigned to the property a ten-year
term of years value, since the brother and sister had successfully possessed
the objects for that period of time.3 9 Using conventional valuation tech-
31. Id.
32. 15 T.C. 770 (1950). For a more thorough discussion of Bluestein, see infra notes 112-23
and accompanying text.
33. TAM 91-52-005, supra note 4, at 16,859.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 16,859-61.
36. For example, although the 1990 legitimate art market would have valued the Quedlinburg
art treasure at between $50 million and $100 million, the fact that it was stolen property prevented
its sale in that market. In the mid- to late 1980s the best of the cache would have brought $9
million in the legitimate market where it proved unsellable. The heirs ultimately were able to
arrange a sale for these few items in the illicit market for $3 million. See supra notes 17-18 and
accompanying text.
37. See TAM 91-52-005, supra note 4, at 16,860. On occasion the value chosen was the
wholesale street market value, and on other occasions it was the retail street market value.
38. Id.
39. TAM 91-52-005, supra note 4, at 16,860-61.
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niques4° the IRS determined that the present value of the right to use the
works of art for the ten-year period constituted 55.8395% of the full fair
market value of the art objects.4 ' The IRS concluded that the fair market
value of the property to be included in the estate was the highest price that
would have been paid for the works of art by a willing buyer in either the
illicit or the legitimate art market.42
The remaining issue resolved by the IRS in TAM 91-52-005 was
whether a deduction should be allowed under I.R.C. § 2053(a)(3),43 for
claims against the estate. Critical to the IRS analysis of this issue was the
fact that § 2053(a)(3) permits a deduction for claims against the estate "al-
lowable by the laws of the jurisdiction... under which the estate is being
administered."'  Upon examining the probate law of Texas, the IRS deter-
mined that claims against the estate by a rightful owner such as the Qued-
linburg church would not be allowable if asserted more than one year after
the granting of letters testamentary to an independent administrator, and
after the distribution of the estate assets.45 Under the facts of the case, no
valid claim was thus allowable against the estate under § 2053(a)(3).46
Although the Quedlinburg church did not have a valid claim against
the estate under Texas probate law, it did have valid claims under Texas
property law that it, as the true owner, could raise against the heirs who
were holders of the stolen property.47 The IRS noted that since these were
not claims against the estate, they were thus not deductible claims described
in § 2053(a)(3) of the Code.4 8
B. TAM 92-07-004: Illegal Drugs
Less than eight weeks after the publication of TAM 91-52-005, the
IRS published TAM 92-07-004, in which it dealt with the estate taxation of
illegal drugs.4 9 The decedent had long been suspected by local and federal
law enforcement authorities of engaging in drug smuggling activities.5" In
January 1987, he arranged for two accomplices to meet him on an unused
40. The IRS used the actuarial valuation tables within Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-10 (as amended
in 1984) to find the amount that, "[a]t a minimum, the decedent successfully transferred to his
siblings." TAM 91-52-005, supra note 4, at 16,860.
41. TAM 91-52-005, supra note 4, at 16,860.
42. Id.
43. I.R.C. § 2053(a)(3) (1988).
44. Id.
45. TAM 91-52-005, supra note 4, at 16,861.
46. Id. at 16,864.
47. See id. at 16,858 (noting true owner's superior right to possession under Texas Law).
48. Id. at 16,864.
49. TAM 92-07-004, supra note 5.
50. Id. at 16,954.
1993]
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stretch of interstate highway in Florida. He had intended to fly in at night
in an airplane full of marijuana, land on the highway, and turn over the
drugs to his accomplices. The accomplices were to have arranged emer-
gency landing lights for the decedent's plane; however, a severe storm re-
sulted in their late arrival at the designated spot. The decedent arrived on
time, and the incomplete arrangements for lighting resulted in the dece-
dent's fatal plane crash.51
When the police arrived at the crash site, they confiscated several bales
of marijuana, weighing a total of 662.5 pounds, which had been smuggled
into Florida by the decedent.52 The authorities found 459.5 pounds of baled
marijuana at the site of the crash and an additional 204.9 pounds of baled
marijuana in the back of a truck driven by the accomplices. 53 The police
also found $2841 in cash at the site of the crash. The accomplices indicated
that the marijuana in their possession belonged to the decedent. All of the
marijuana and the cash were ordered forfeited and confiscated under the
drug enforcement laws of the State of Florida.54
In TAM 92-07-004, the IRS addressed the following three issues: (1)
whether the drugs in possession of the decedent were includible in his es-
tate; (2) if includible, how to determine their fair market value; and (3)
whether confiscation of the drugs and other property involved in drug
smuggling activities should impact on the allowability of a deduction under
either § 2053(a)(3)55 or § 205456 of the Code.
The first issue the IRS resolved was whether the seized drugs were to
be included in the estate of the decedent.57 Since the two accomplices were
found to be the decedent's agents, the drugs they held, as well as the drugs
found at the crash site, were all deemed to be the decedent's property.58 As
it had in TAM 91-52-005, the IRS indicated that the economic equivalence
of ownership of property that is in the possession and control of the dece-
dent determines its inclusion in the estate.59 Consequently, because the de-
cedent possessed the economic equivalence of ownership of the marijuana,
its value was to be included in his estate.6" The IRS also noted that, just as
51. Id
52. Id.
53. All figures are as reported in TAM 92-07-004. Id. Clearly 204.9 pounds plus 459.5
pounds add up to 664.4 pounds, not 662.5 pounds, of marijuana. TAM 92-07-004 offers no expla-
nation for the 1.9 pound discrepancy. Id
54. d at 16,954-55.
55. LR.C. § 2053(a)(3) (1988).
56. LR.C. § 2054 (1988).
57. TAM 92-07-004, supra note 5, at 16,955-56.
58. See id.
59. Id.
60. Id at 16,956.
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income from drug trafficking activities is to be taxed to the smuggler who
possesses a controlled substance, so too should a controlled substance in his
possession be included in his estate at death.61
The second issue addressed in TAM 92-07-004 was the appropriate
value to be assigned to the marijuana that was included in the decedent's
estate.62 Because the drugs in question were destroyed after being confis-
cated, there was no evidence of the marijuana's quality. Assuming that it
was of average grade, the IRS assigned a value based on "retail street
value" for average grade marijuana. The IRS selected retail street value
because the intended buyers of the drug included street dealers as well as
distributors to street dealers. It also selected the area of the city in which
the intended sales were to take place as the appropriate geographic market
in which to value the drugs.63
Finally, the IRS addressed whether a deduction should be allowed to
the estate under § 2053(a)(3) 4 or § 205465 of the Code, based on the con-
fiscation of the narcotics.66 Section 2053(a)(3) allows a deduction for
claims against the estate allowable by the laws of the jurisdiction in which
the estate is being administered.67 Section 2054 allows a deduction for
losses incurred during settling of the estate arising from fire, storm, ship-
wreck, other casualties, or theft.68 Under Florida law,69 the decedent's nar-
cotics and cash were seized and the narcotics destroyed. Consequently, if
its attempt to gain a deduction under § 2053(a)(3) failed, the decedent's
estate apparently hoped to obtain a deduction for the seized cash and the
value of the destroyed controlled substances under § 2054. Without ad-
dressing the issue of which, if either, of the two sections applied, the IRS
held that to allow any deduction under either section would frustrate sharply
defined public policies against drug trafficking.7 ° As authority for this po-
sition, the IRS cited a number of income tax cases in which a deduction for
61. Id. at 16,955-56.
62. Id. at 16,956-57.
63. Id. No mention was made of the volume of seized drugs, whether it would be reasonable
to sell this amount at retail on the street in one day, or the impact on street value of this quantity of
marijuana. Because of the author's proposed analysis of the valuation issue, it will not be neces-
sary to consider the appropriateness of the use of a blockage discount. See infra notes 131-80 and
accompanying text.
64. I.R.C. § 2053(a)(3) (1988).
65. I.R.C. § 2054 (1988).
66. TAM 92-07-004, supra note 5, at 16,957-58.
67. I.R.C. § 2053(a)(3) (1988).
68. I.R.C. § 2054 (1988).
69. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 893.12(1) (West Supp. 1993).
70. TAM 92-07-004, supra note 5, at 16,957-58 (citing Smith v. Commissioner, No.
90-1143, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 18741 (4th Cir. Aug. 15, 1991) (per curiam); Wood v. United
States, 863 F.2d 417 (5th Cir. 1989); Gambina v. Commissioner, 91 T.C. 826 (1988); Holt v.
1993]
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a loss was denied to drug traffickers whose controlled substances had been
seized and destroyed.7'
II. INcLuDiBiLrry
Section 2033 of the Code provides that "[t]he value of the gross estate
shall include the value of all property to the extent of the interest therein of
the decedent at the time of his death."72 It is well worth noting that the
Code does not speak in terms of ownership or other well-established con-
cepts of various property interests. Congress employed rather general lan-
guage (i.e., "interest") in describing the reach of § 2033. The regulations
indicate that mere beneficial, as opposed to legal, ownership of property is
sufficient to result in its inclusion under § 2033.13 Based on these two fac-
tors alone, one might be tempted to conclude that the fruits of crime that
individuals acquire should be included in their estates. Moreover, once one
recalls that the courts readily include the fruits of criminal activities in the
incomes of criminals, the case for inclusion becomes beguilingly
compelling.74
Unfortunately, in construing the estate and gift taxes, the courts have
tended to adopt a technical, mechanistic approach, rather than the substan-
tive economic analysis that typically predominates in the income tax area.75
Consequently, the courts' approach to estate and gift tax cases is vaguely
Commissioner, 69 T.C. 75 (1977); Bailey v. Commissioner, 58 T.C.M. (CCH) 1030 (1989), affd,
929 F.2d 700 (6th Cir. 1991)).
71. Id.
72. I.R.C. § 2033 (1988) (emphasis added).
73. Treas. Reg. § 20.2033-1(a) (as amended in 1992).
74. See, e.g., James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213, 219 (1961) (holding that embezzled
funds are income); Wood v. United States, 863 F.2d 417, 419 (5th Cir. 1989) (holding that pro-
ceeds from drug smuggling are income). For a general discussion of this issue, see 1 BoRIS
Bn7ri , FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES mD GIFrs 6.5 (1981).
As a prelude to the discussion of whether the fruits of criminal activity should be included in
the estate, it is noteworthy that many great fortunes have been amassed, at least in part, by unscru-
pulous means. For example, many wealthy landowners in Oklahoma can likely trace the acquisi-
tion of their property to ancestors who surveyed and staked their claim to land prior to the official
opening of the territory by the federal government for that purpose. Those who participated in this
illegal act came to be known as "sooners," a nickname the state still bears proudly today. See
STAN Homo, THE OKLAnomA LAND RUSH OF 1889, at 187-222 (1984).
In addition, some have suggested that the Rockefeller fortune, one of America's most fa-
mous, was significantly enhanced by any number of activities that were certainly ethically, if not
legally, questionable. See JuLEs ABELs, THm RocKaE.LER BuONs (1965). Most recently, vio-
lation of various securities laws has led to the rise, and fall, of any number of Wall Street "wiz-
ards" during the 1980s. See, e.g., MARK STmmNS, THE INsnomEs (1987); JAxNs B. STEwART, DN
OF Tmmvas (1991).
75. See, e.g., United States v. Byrum, 408 U.S. 125, reh'g denied, 409 U.S. 898 (1972);
Helvering v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 316 U.S. 56 (1942).
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reminiscent of the formulaic approach to property law that is a hallmark of
an area such as future interests.76
One of the principal results of these contrasting approaches to tax leg-
islation in the estate and income tax areas is that most of the study of estate
tax consists of an exploration of various Code provisions77 added to restore
some vigor to § 2033,78 which the courts have sapped of its potential
strength. On the other hand, the courts have given § 61, 79 the income tax's
equivalent of § 2033, a broad reading based on economic realities. As a
result, much of Congress's efforts in the income tax area have dealt with
providing exclusions and deductions that diminish the broad sweep of § 61.
Why is estate taxation typically characterized by a technical, mechan-
istic construction and income taxation characterized by a substantive eco-
nomic analysis? Perhaps it is because much of the early scholarship in the
estate tax area and many of the estate planning practitioners drew heavily
on the work of the property bar, in an area of the law where form often is
more important than substance. In contrast, much of the early scholarship
in the income tax area drew on the work of business lawyers, economists,
and experts in public finance who regularly encounter the realities of the
market place. Whatever the reason, it is important to keep in mind this
distinction, lest we be too confident of the value, to estate tax analysis, of a
whole host of scholarship and learning on the income taxation of the fruits
of crime.
76. See, e.g., Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361 (1960); Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S.
331 (1940). These differences between the two areas are illustrated by several cases and authori-
ties. For example, in Helvering v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., the Supreme Court held that § 2033
did not reach a combination life estate and testamentary general power of appointment, which had
been left to the decedent by his parents and resulted in his substantial ownership of the property in
question. 316 U.S. at 59. This result can be contrasted profitably with "ownership of income"
cases such as Helvering v. Clifford and Commissioner v. Culbertson, 337 U.S. 733 (1949), in the
assignment of income area, in which the Court was basically concerned with the possession of
substantive economic interests. Similarly, the Court in Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co. v. Smith,
356 U.S. 274 (1958), applied § 2036 to include in the decedent's estate property in which the
decedent retained a life estate. However, the Court held that § 2036 did not reach an annuity-life
insurance combination, purchased by a 76-year-old from the same insurer, without the require-
ment that the insured undergo a physical. Id. at 280. The Court refused to follow the suggestion
that the case be analyzed by combining the two policies. Id. This case should be contrasted with
Rev. Rul. 65-57, 1965-1 C.B. 56, and Kess v. United States, 451 F.2d 1229, 1231 (6th Cir. 1971),
in which the IRS and the court refused to treat an annuity-life insurance combination as insurance
under I.R.C. § 101 (1988), which excludes life insurance proceeds from income, since the com-
bined purchase deprived the taxpayer's life insurance purchase of the risk-spreading characteristic
of insurance.
77. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 2036-2041 (1988 & Supp. 11 1991).
78. I.R.C. § 2033 (1988).
79. I.R.C. § 61 (1988).
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A. Property Law as Authority for Inclusion
In Morgan v. Commissioner,0 the Supreme Court stated that "[s]tate
law creates legal interests and rights. The federal revenue acts designate
what interests or rights, so created, shall be taxed.""1 Thus, to determine if
holding property that constitutes the fruit of criminal activity creates any
transferrable rights in the decedent that can be taxed under § 2033, it is
helpful to examine basic state property law with respect to stolen property
and contraband.
In determining whether the possessor of such goods has sufficient
rights in that property to justify inclusion in the estate, the IRS, in both
TAM 91-52-005 and TAM 92-07-004, resorted to the basic rule that the
possessor of property, even one who lacks legal title, has valuable economic
interests in that property.82
According to classic hornbook law, the possessor of property generally
has a claim to the property that is superior to that of all but the true owner.83
In actuality, one who wishes to deprive a possessor of property does not
need to show that she is the "true owner" of the property; she merely needs
to show that she has a better claim to it than the possessor. For example,
although a purchaser of a stolen painting might have to return it to the
individual from whom she unlawfully took it, she nonetheless could recover
it from a thief who stole it from her. This idea is best described as the
theory of relativity of title.84 For simplicity, however, this paper will refer
to parties with a superior claim to title as "true owners."
Cases involving claims to allegedly stolen property typically involve
two critical issues: (1) the relative superiority of the claims of the compet-
ing parties; and (2) when the statute of limitations commences running
against an individual whose claim to the property is superior to that of the
possessor.8 5 Typically, cases involving stolen works of art do not involve
80. 309 U.S. 78 (1940). For a general discussion of the role of state and federal law in the
process, see RicHARD S HERmNs Er AL., FEDERAL ESTATE AND Giwr TAXATION 4.05[2] (5th ed.
1983 & Supp. 1990).
81. Morgan, 309 U.S. at 80.
82. See TAM 91-52-005, supra note 4, at 16,857-58; TAM 92-07-004, supra note 5, at
16,955.
83. See RAY A. BROWN & WALTER B. RAUSHENBUSH, TmE LAW OF PERSONAL PROPERTY
§ 11.11, at 311 (3d ed. 1975), which states: "[E]ven a convertor who tortiously holds the goods
of another has been held able to recover their value from a third person who, while the goods were
in the plaintiff's possession, damaged or converted them." Id. (footnote omitted).
84. See JESSE DuledNIER & JAmFs E. KRmR, PROPERTY 65 (2d ed. 1988); RoGR A. CUN.
NmGHAM ET AL., THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 1.3 (1984).
85. See Patty Gerstenblith, The Adverse Possession of Personal Property, 37 BUFF. L. Rv.
119, 126-27 (1988/89) (citing, inter alia, Trust Co. Bank v. Union Circulation Co., 245 S.E.2d
297, 298 (Ga. 1978); Christensen Grain, Inc. v. Garden City Coop., Equity Exch., 391 P.2d 81,
84-85 (Kan. 1964)); John G. Petrovich, Comment, The Recovery of Stolen Art: Of Paintings,
[Vol. 72
ESTATE TAXATION
defendants who are thieves, but rather individuals who, with varying de-
grees of good faith, have purchased art works from thieves or their confi-
dants. Plaintiffs from whom the property was stolen are typically drawn
from the ranks of artists, private collectors, gallery owners, and museums.
The law holds that even in a sale to a bona fide purchaser, a thief cannot
convey title that will defeat the claim to property of the true owner.8 6
Plaintiffs can typically prove the superiority of their title quite easily;
they find that their biggest burden is satisfying the statute of limitations in
an action for replevin of converted assets. In essence, the defendant posses-
sors assert that, although they may not originally have had superior title to
the art work, they have acquired such title through adverse possession.
A statute of limitations commences running from the time a cause of
action accrues.87 Under the old law regarding conversions, the cause of
action accrued when the property changed possession. 8 This rule operated
as a great hardship on the victims of art thefts because, due to the portable
nature of the property, they often had difficulty knowing whom to sue.
Many foreign countries, nonetheless, continue to follow this rule. As a re-
sult, the game in international art theft involves a mad rush to place hot
items within these countries' borders.8 9 American jurisdictions have devel-
oped rules regarding the running of the statute of limitations based on the
concept that a cause of action cannot accrue until the facts or events that
permit maintenance of a lawsuit have occurred. 90
Two principal rules delay the running of the statute of limitations in
theft actions: the demand and refusal rule91 and the discovery rule.92
Although the demand and refusal rule is the minority rule, it is the rule in
Statues, and Statutes of Limitations, 27 UCLA L. REv. 1122, 1128-32 (1980) (citing, inter alia,
Scroggin Farms Corp. v. McFadden, 165 F.2d 10, 18 (8th Cir. 1948); Jackson v. American Credit
Bureau, Inc., 531 P.2d 932, 934 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1975)).
86. The classic statement of this principle is provided by Basset v. Spofford, 45 N.Y. 387,
391 (1871):
By the larcenous taking of chattels the owner is not divested of his property, and a
transfer to a purchaser does not impair the right of the true owner. A purchase of stolen
goods either directly from the thief or from any other person, although in the ordinary
course of trade and in good faith, will not give a title against the owner. In the case of a
felonious taking of goods, the owner may follow and reclaim them wherever he may
find them.
87. See Petrovich, supra note 85, at 1128-29.
88. See Gerstenblith, supra note 85, at 126.
89. See TAM 91-52-005, supra note 4, at 16,857 (citing Fox Butterfield, Boston Museum
Says It Was Uninsured for Theft, N.Y. Times, Mar. 20, 1990, at Al, C20 (naming South America
and Japan as favorable locations to possess stolen art)).
90. See Petrovich, supra note 85, at 1128-32.
91. Id. at 1133-40.
92. Id. at 1149-57.
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New York, which dominates the American art market. Consequently, it is
of some importance. Under this rule, an action for replevin cannot com-
mence until after the "true owner" has made a demand to the possessor for
return of the property, and the possessor refuses its return. Until that has
been done, the statute of limitations does not begin to run. Moreover, under
the demand and refusal rule an innocent holder becomes a wrongdoer only
after refusal and, until that moment, is considered to be in lawful possession
of the property.93 Under the discovery rule, in contrast, the statute of limi-
tations does not commence running until the "true owner" discovers, or by
exercising due diligence could have discovered, the whereabouts of the sto-
len object with such specificity as would enable him to commence a suit for
replevin.94
The above general discussion of the law regarding stolen property am-
ply demonstrates that holders of stolen property do possess valuable rights.
Even a thief possesses rights to the property that are superior to those of
many other parties. For example, as the possessor of the property, a thief
has rights in it that are superior to those of all but a few potential claimants
(e.g., the "true owner"). Until the "true owner" asserts his claim to the
property, the thief will at least enjoy possession of the property. Given the
proper circumstances (e.g., a nondiligent "true owner,") a thief's rights in
the property could even eventually supersede those of the "true owner."
Given these principles, it is apparent that the possessory interest of a
thief represents a valuable property interest that should be included in his
estate. Thus, the real issue in such cases should be the value to be assigned
to the thief's interest. For example, a thief who holds a $1 million stolen
painting has at least the fair market value of the potential enjoyment of the
painting for a limited period of time, a benefit that is admittedly far less
than the full fair market value of the property itself. The thief also has the
potential to realize the property's full fair market value if he is able to trans-
port the property to a jurisdiction with a favorable statute of limitations, or
if the true owner merely lacks due diligence. It should not be forgotten that,
even after the Quedlinburg church lay claim to its treasures, Mr. Meador's
heirs remained in possession of a number of works of art to which the estate
apparently had a dubious title, but for which there was no other claimant. 95
93. See, e.g., Kunstsammlungen zu Weimar v. Elicofon, 678 F.2d 1150, 1161 (2d Cir. 1982);
Menzel v. List, 267 N.Y.S.2d 804, 809 (Sup. Ct. 1966), modified as to damages, 279 N.Y.S.2d
608 (App. Div. 1967), rev'd as to modifications, 246 N.E.2d 742 (N.Y. 1969). If the "true owner"
fails to exercise "due diligence" in searching for his missing property, laches can bar his action to
recover the property. DeWeerth v. Baldinger, 836 F.2d 103, 107-08 (2d Cir. 1987).
94. See, e.g., Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church of Cyprus v. Goldberg & Feldman Fine
Arts, Inc., 917 F.2d 278, 288-89, reh'g denied, en banc, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 20398 (7th Cir.
1990); O'Keeffe v. Snyder, 416 A.2d 862, 869-70 (Ni. 1980).
95. See TAM 91-52-005, supra note 4, at 16,856.
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Thus, the critical issue in the case of stolen property should be that of deter-
mining the value of the rights held by the possessor, and not the mere verifi-
cation of the existence of rights in the property that the possessor can pass
to his heirs.
After a careful search of cases dealing with property disputes over con-
traband, this author found only cases involving disputes between so-called
"true owners" and governmental agencies laying claim to the property.96
Media accounts do report occasional disputes between governmental agen-
cies that assert competing claims to contraband, although none of these dis-
putes appear to have resulted in any reported litigation. 7 It should come as
no surprise that private citizens with disputed claims over contraband do not
resort to the courts. Nonetheless, despite a lack of judicial consideration of
the property interests in contraband, it seems safe to conclude that the same
basic principles that apply to stolen property in general also apply to contra-
band, with the result that even its illegal possession should be held to give
rise to a valuable property interest taxable under § 2033.98
B. Income Tax as Authority for Inclusion
As the IRS noted in TAM 91-52-005 and TAM 92-07-004, the income
tax treatment of income derived from illegal activities is now quite well
established.99 After struggling with the issue in several cases,"° the
96. For some interesting cases involving disputes over ownership of contraband between
governments and individuals from whom the goods were seized, see, e.g., United States v. Martin-
son, 809 F.2d 1364, 1365 (9th Cir. 1987) (addressing situation in which individual sought return
of antique guns that had been seized at the time of his improper arrest); People v. Rautenkranz,
641 P.2d 317, 318 (Colo. Ct. App. 1982) (dealing with plaintiff seeking return of a seized Jeep
claiming it was not "contraband"); State v. Carassa, 549 A.2d 458, 459 (N.J. Super. CL App. Div.
1988) (involving plaintiff seeking return of various items of jewelry that had been seized as a
result of his arrest for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute).
97. See John D. Cramer, Supervisors to Sue Sheriff Duffy Over Drug Funds, L.A. Tnsms,
Nov. 7, 1990, at Bi; Fred Strasser & Marcia Coyle, DEA and Customs Spar Over Drug Forfeit-
ures, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 20, 1989, at 5; Sam Enriquez, Seized in Raids; Police Seek Bigger Share of
Drug Cash, L.A. Tvrms, Apr. 20, 1986, § 2, at 1.
98. I.R.C. § 2033 (1988).
99. As a cautionary prelude to using the income tax to analyze the estate tax, it should be
noted that the estate, gift, and income taxes, while partially integrated, are separate taxes that
cannot be expected to yield consistent results. The spirit of this state of affairs was best captured
by Judge Jerome Frank in Commissioner v. Beck's Estate, 129 F.2d 243, 244 (2d Cir. 1942), in
which the court dealt with the seeming inconsistency of results under the income, estate, and gift
taxes in the tax treatment of an allegedly completed gift. Judge Frank indicated that the inconsis-
tent results might be easier to abide if Congress had used the terms "gift," "gaft," and "geft' to
describe gratuitous inter vivos conveyances under each of the taxes. Id. at 246.
100. See Rutkin v. United States, 343 U.S. 130, 137-39, reh'g denied, 343 U.S. 952 (1952);
Commissioner v. Wilcox, 327 U.S. 404, 406-10 (1946); United States v. Sullivan, 274 U.S. 259,
262-63 (1927). For a good discussion of the history of the taxation of income derived from illegal
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Supreme Court determined in James v. United States'01 that income derived
from an illegal activity, such as embezzlement, was to be included in the
taxable income of the recipients of such income." z In so holding, the Court
overruled an earlier decision, Commissioner v. Wilcox," 3 in which the
Court had held that because an embezzler is under a legal obligation to pay
back the embezzled funds, they do not constitute income.x" In Wilcox, the
duty to repay had been viewed as the equivalent of a liability, which ne-
gated the accretion represented by the value of the embezzled funds." 5 The
Court, in rejecting its earlier decision, held:
When a taxpayer acquires earnings, lawfully or unlawfully, with-
out the consensual recognition, express or implied, of an obliga-
tion to repay and without restriction as to their disposition, "he
has received income which he is required to return, even though it
may still be claimed that he is not entitled to retain the money,
and even though he may still be adjudged liable to restore its
equivalent."10 6
Since James, it has been well settled that the fruits of criminal activi-
ties are taxable as income.10 7 Drug dealers, perpetrators of mail fraud, and
others whose assets were seized under RICO 08 recently have sought to
avoid tax liability on the ground that, because RICO effects a technical
legal forfeiture of assets ab initio, the holders of these illegally derived
goods never technically owned the fruits of their crimes.' 0 9 The courts
have rejected this argument" 0 on the ground that "the test for taxable in-
come is not title. The test is actual dominion and control.""'
activities, see Boris . Bittker, Taxing Income From Unlawful Activities, 25 CAss W. REs. L. REv.
130, 131-37 (1974).
101. 366 U.S. 213 (1961).
102. Id. at 213-22.
103. 327 U.S. 404 (1946).
104. ldi at 408.
105. Id.
106. James, 366 U.S. at 219 (quoting North Am. Oil v. Burnet, 286 U.S. 417, 424 (1932)).
107. See 1 Brrri , supra note 74, 6.5.
108. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988 &
Supp. ll 1991).
109. See Wood v. United States, 863 F.2d 417, 419 (5th Cir. 1989); lanniello v. Commis-
sioner, 98 T.C. 165, 172 (1992); Gambina v. Commissioner, 91 T.C. 826, 828 (1988).
110. Wood, 863 F.2d at 419; lanniello, 98 T.C. at 172-74; Gambina, 91 T.C. at 828-29.
111. Wood, 863 F.2d at 419.
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C. Bluestein Distinguished
The Bluestein"2 case, which the IRS distinguished from the facts in
TAM 91-52-005,113 represents a rather special set of facts with little general
application to the basic problem under analysis. Lena Bluestein died in Port
Arthur, Texas, in 1919.114 By will, she appointed her husband Alec execu-
tor of her estate, which consisted of both her separate property and commu-
nity business assets held with Alec. Lena's will divided her separate and
community property equally among her three minor sons. Alec, in probat-
ing his wife's estate, only informed the court of her ownership of separate
property that was distributed to his minor children. He never informed the
probate court of the existence of considerable community assets that were
held in his name. Moreover, during the minority of his children, Alec ap-
propriated to himself the sales proceeds of separately held assets that the
children had inherited from their mother. 115
Alec never informed his children of the existence of their mother's will
or of their ownership of any property inherited from her. Throughout his
life he held himself out as the sole owner of the community business prop-
erty.116 At his death in 1944, Alec left these assets to two of his sons who
worked in the businesses. Shortly after Alec's death, a third son, Edward,
discovered the existence of his mother's will and brought suit in Texas Dis-
trict Court to obtain a one-third interest in one-half of the community busi-
ness interests held in Alec's name.1 17
The Texas District Court determined that Alec owned only one-half of
the business interests held in his name and that the balance, representing the
community interest of Lena, was owned one-third by each of the sons and
presumably held by Alec as a trustee for the children." 8 Consequently,
Lena's assets held by Alec were not to be included in Alec's estate. The
entire proceeding was completed within less than seven months of Alec's
death.119
The sole issue raised by the Commissioner in Bluestein was whether
the Tax Court was obliged to follow the decisions of the Texas courts as to
112. Estate of Bluestein v. Commissioner, 15 T.C. 770 (1950).
113. See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
114. Bluestein, 15 T.C. at 773.
115. Id. at 774-75.
116. Id.
117. laU at 776-77.
118. Id. at 777-78.
119. See id. at 771, 777. A party with an interest adversely affected by the Tax Court's deci-
sion unsuccessfully sought to have it set aside by the Texas Court for Civil Appeals. Born v.
Bluestein, 220 S.W.2d 345 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949).
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the extent of Alec's estate. Operating under the pre-Boscht20 rule of
Freuler v. Helvering,'2' the Tax Court decided that it was so bound. 122
Several points should be made about Bluestein. First, the Tax Court
never really addressed the issue raised by TAM 91-52-005. Following the
Freuler rule, the Tax Court, probably erroneously, never felt free to explore
de novo the real issue of the includibility of the property originally held by
Lena. For example, although a Texas state court determined that Lena was
the owner of one-half of the family businesses, the Tax Court never dis-
cussed the propriety of considering whether Alec's conflicting claim to that
property constituted a valuable property right held by him at his death. Sec-
ond, the prompt determination of the true nature of Alec's property interest
in the business operated under his name makes this case factually distin-
guishable from the situation described in TAM 91-52-005. Third, the result
in Bluestein is completely consistent with the inclusion of the misappropri-
ated interests in Alec's estate, followed by the allowance, based on the
Texas judicial proceedings, of a claim against the estate under
§ 2053(a)(3)" for the value of the misappropriated interests.
This is, in fact, what happened in Russell v. United States,124 a case
that is factually similar to Bluestein. There the decedent, a trustee of assets
held for the benefit of her children, never informed the beneficiaries of the
existence of the trust and treated the assets as her own. After her death, an
estate tax return was filed that included the trust assets as being owned by
the decedent. During pendency of probate, the children discovered the
existence of the trust. They filed a claim in probate for the trust assets,
120. Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456 (1967). In this case, the Supreme Court
determined how federal courts hearing estate tax cases should deal with state court determinations
of the ownership of property potentially includible in the estate. The court indicated that in such
circumstances proper regard, not finality, should be given to state trial court determinations in
bona fide adversary proceedings. Decisions of intermediate state appellate courts should not be
disregarded unless the federal court is convinced that the state's highest court would decide the
matter otherwise. Decisions of a state's highest court regarding ownership of property rights po-
tentially included in the estate were to be followed, the Supreme Court indicated. Id. at 465.
121. 291 U.S. 35 (1934). Freuler is a poorly written opinion by Justice Roberts that lower
courts concluded, probably erroneously, indicated that state trial court determinations regarding
property interests were binding on federal courts in tax cases. See Gilbert P. Verbit, State Court
Decisions in Federal Transfer Tax Litigation: Bosch Revisited, 23 REAL PRoP. PROB. & TR. J.
407, 414-17 (1988) (describing the interpretation of Freuler by Ilinois courts).
122. Bluestein, 15 T.C. at 783-84. It is fair to guess that the Commissioner smelled a hint of
collusion in the above scenario. Since Alec's estate was taxed at a marginal rate substantially in
excess of 33%, even the two brothers active in the business stood to benefit from the above result;
the net loss of a one-sixth interest in "their mother's half' of the business by each of the two sons
active in the business was more than offset by the fact that the one-third interest thus passing to
each of them from their mother would escape any estate tax if it was found not to be a component
of their father's estate.
123. I.RIC. § 2053(a)(3) (1988).
124. 260 F. Supp. 493 (N.D. Ill. 1966).
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which apparently were paid to them. The executor then amended the estate
tax return, claiming a refund for the amount paid to the children as a claim
against the estate under § 2053(a)(3). The district court allowed the claim
as a deduction.'25
The dispute in Russell involved the allowance of a deduction.12 6
Although the plaintiff could have based his claim for refund on the alleg-
edly erroneous inclusion of misappropriated property, he chose not to do so.
Consequently, the court in Russell, like the court in Bluestein, was never
called upon to address squarely the issue of the includibility of misappropri-
ated property in the estate of the wrongdoer.
D. Summary
Federal income tax, law, as well as substantive property law, indicate
that both contraband and stolen property over which the decedent exercised
dominion and control should be included in the decedent's estate. This
most certainly should be the case where, as in TAM 91-52-005, the heirs
also sought to assert dominion and control over the assets for a number of
years after the assets came into their hands. The decedents in both TAM
91-52-005 and TAM 92-07-004 held valuable property interests in the as-
sets that they possessed. Their deaths effected a transfer of their interests in
these assets to their respective heirs. The requirements of § 2033 and of the
estate tax have been satisfied. The next issue in need of discussion is the
value to be assigned to those interests.
I. VALUATION
Under § 2031 of the Code, the gross estate of the decedent consists of
"the value at the time of his death of all property" includible in his estate.1
2 7
The statute does not indicate how value is to be determined, but the relevant
regulations provide that the value of property is its fair market value, de-
fined as "[t]he price at which the property would change hands between a
willing buyer and a willing seller, neither being under any compulsion to
buy or to sell and both having reasonable knowledge of relevant facts.' 28
125. Id. at 496-501.
126. The IRS objected to the deduction on the ground that it violated standards promulgated in
Rev. Rul. 60-247, 1960-2 C.B. 272. The district court rejected the interpretation of I.R.C.
§ 2053(c)(3) given by the IRS in Rev. Rul. 60-247 and allowed the deduction. Russell, 260 F.
Supp. at 499-500. The opinion in Russell, like the opinion in Bluestein, is hardly a model of
clarity.
127. LR.C. § 2031 (1988).
128. Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-1(b) (as amended in 1965).
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The need to determine fair market value under the Code is not limited
to this one application in the estate tax, but extends to the gift tax 129 and
income tax 130 as well. Because the same definition of fair market value is
used in these taxes, relevant authorities involving gift and income taxes will
also be used throughout the following discussion.
A. Valuation of Stolen Property
In addressing the valuation issue with respect to the stolen property
involved in TAM 91-52-005, the IRS indicated that it is appropriate to
value the stolen works of art in both the legitimate and illicit art markets,
and that the appropriate value for estate tax purposes is "the highest price
that would have been paid at that time whether in the discreet retail market
or in the legitimate art market."'' It also backstopped the valuation issue
by determining a minimum term-of-years value based on the ten-year pe-
riod of time during which the decedent's siblings held the art works.
1. Consideration of Illicit Market Valuation
In justifying the propriety of considering the illicit market value of
stolen property, the IRS cited several income tax cases in which it had esti-
mated drug dealers' taxable incomes based on the receipts that they would
have reaped from their activities in the illegal drug market.13 2 Use of such
data in assigning value in TAM 91-52-005 appears to be justified, partly
because the decedent apparently used the illicit market to dispose of stolen
art works, and because the heirs themselves also sought to use this market
to realize the illicit market value of the property. Moreover, as previously
noted, the decedent's heirs received from him a thief s possessory interest
in the works of art, which concededly is of some value. 133 It grants to the
owner an interest in the property which is superior to that of all the world
other than the "true owner." If this possessory interest's highest value ex-
ists in the illicit market, then that is where it should be valued.
129. I.R.C. § 2512(a) (1988). The gift tax regulations contain a definition of value identical to
that provided by the estate tax regulations. See Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-1 (as amended in 1992).
130. Fair market value must be determined under the income tax for the purpose of measuring
the value of in-kind receipts as income and for the purpose of measuring the amount of permitted
deductions. I.R.C. § 170 (1988 & Supp. ITI 1991), which allows a deduction for gifts to charities,
provides one of the most common of such opportunities. The regulations under § 170 contain a
definition of fair market value identical to that found in the estate and gift tax regulations. See
Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-l(c)(2) (as amended in 1990).
131. TAM 91-52-005, supra note 4, at 16,861.
132. See Browning v. Commissioner, 61 T.C.M. (CCH) 2053,2062 (1991); Jones v. Commis-
sioner, 61 T.C.M. (CC-) 1721, 1736 (1991); Caffery v. Commissioner, 60 T.C.M. (CCH) 807,
816 (1990). The facts of Jones and Caffery are discussed infra note 176.
133. See supra notes 80-98 and accompanying text.
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2. Selection of the Correct Value
The IRS's use of the highest value in either the legitimate or illicit
markets merits some discussion. When it refers to the legitimate art market
value of stolen property, TAM 91-52-005 is unclear as to whether it is re-
ferring to the value realizable in that market by the "true owner" or the
value realizable in that market by the thief.134 If the IRS seeks to assign the
true owner's legitimate market value to the thief's possessory interest, this
is clearly a wrong result, as the following discussion will bear out. 135 If the
IRS, in its reference to "the highest price.., in the discreet retail market or
the legitimate art market," is referring to the highest price which would be
paid in either market for a thief's possessory interest, with all parties fully
informed as to its nature, then this author and the authorities discussed be-
low are in full accord with that position.
Although the legitimate art market, circa 1990, assigned a value to the
Quedlinburg art treasure ranging between $50 million and $100 million,136
the decedent's siblings were unable to obtain more than $3 million in the
illicit market for the most valuable piece alone. They ultimately realized
only $2.75 million on the entire Quedlinburg treasure.' 3 7 Leaving aside for
the time being the issue of changes in the value of the property from the
time of the decedent's death in 1980 to 1990, the first issue to resolve is the
relevance of the art objects' legitimate market value of between $50 million
and $100 million. This value is irrelevant because it (or its comparable
1980 value) represents the "true owner" fair market value, not the thief's
possessory interest value that the decedent had and transferred to his heirs.
The thief's possessory interest is reflected by the value range of $2.75 to 3
million that the heirs developed in the illicit market and the reward market.
As that value is all the decedent's heirs could hope to receive for the art, it
represents the value of the interest conveyed by the decedent to his heirs.'
38
In essence, the use of an illicit market value or the reward value for
such property provides a workable mechanism for obtaining a value for the
limited property interest which the possessor has in the stolen goods. It is
comparable to establishing a discounted fair market value for a situation
where the possessor holds property under a clouded title.
134. See TAM 91-52-005, supra note 4, at 16,859-61.
135. See infra notes 136-49 and accompanying text.
136. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
137. See supra notes 18, 21 and accompanying text.
138. After resolving the need to dismiss the "true owner" value in the legitimate art market
from consideration in this case, it would then be necessary to determine the 1980 date-of-death
illicit market value or reward value for the stolen treasure to determine the value to be included in
the decedent's estate.
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The judiciary has long dealt with clouded titles in tax valuation cases
and has had no difficulty in including such interests in the estate subject to a
discount representing the cloud on the title. For example, in Adams v. Com-
missioner,139 the taxpayer donated the original prototype of the famed Nor-
den bombsight to the Smithsonian Museum, claiming a value of $75,000.14
Because there was some dispute as to whether the taxpayer, the inventor's
donee, had good title to the prototype or whether it belonged to the U.S.
government for whom it was developed, the court decided that a reduction
in value was called for to reflect this cloud on title. 14 1
Porter v. Commissioner" involved a set of facts similar to those in
Bluestein.43 The decedent had previously been divorced from her spouse
in a community property state.'" The former husband held all property in
his name and maintained that all was his separate property. 145 At the dece-
dent's death, her surviving issue who were the sole legatees under her
will, 146 instituted suit to obtain one-half of such property based on it actu-
ally being community property.' 47 They ultimately prevailed at trial.' 48
The Tax Court held that, at the mother's death, her estate should include the
value of her community interest minus a significant deduction to reflect the
cloud over title produced by the husband's claim that the property was sep-
arate and not community property. 149
3. In the Alternative: Term-of-Years Valuation
The last issue worthy of discussion is the appropriateness of the IRS's
use of the discounted term of years value as a backstop to the valuation
issue. Using standard valuation tables prescribed under Regulation section
20.2031-1,15 the IRS determined that, since the decedent, at a minimum,
had successfully transferred to his siblings a ten-year undisturbed
term-of-years in the stolen art works beginning in 1980, 55.8395% of the
1980 fair market value of that property should be included in his estate.' 5 '
139. 50 T.C.M. (CCH) 48 (1985).
140. Id. at 49.
141. Id. at 50-52.
142. 49 T.C. 207 (1967).
143. See supra notes 112-23 and accompanying text.
144. Porter, 49 T.C. at 209.
145. Id. at 211.
146. Id. at 209.
147. Il at 211.
148. 49 T.C. at 213 (citing Porter v. Porter, 331 P.2d 360 (N.M. 1958)).
149. Id. at 219-24. For a more concise exposition of the thrust of the decision, see the concur-
ring opinion of Judge Raum. I& at 227 (Raum, J., concurring).
150. Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-10 (as amended in 1984).
151. TAM 91-52-005, supra note 4, at 16,860.
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Several criticisms can be made of this approach. First, it is based on
ten years' worth of hindsight, and as such is of no value in establishing a
1980 fair market value. Second, even if employed, all the decedent actually
transferred to his siblings was the right to enjoy the art works for ten years.
They in essence received 55.8395% of the right to enjoy the collected man-
uscripts, reliquaries, coins, and the like. There is no evidence of the value
of the right to enjoy only, exclusive of the right to sell the stolen works of
art. Presumably, the right to enjoy such items is only a fraction of their
illicit market sale value.
B. Valuation of Seized Contraband
Analysis of the valuation issue with respect to contraband is closely
related to the valuation analysis of stolen property. Much of this section
will reinforce conclusions drawn above. In TAM 92-07-004, the IRS con-
cluded that the 662.5 pounds of marijuana held by the drug-smuggling tax-
payer at his death should be valued for inclusion in his estate at the "retail
street value" of average grade marijuana in the city area near the crash site.
Determining the appropriate market for valuation of goods is often dif-
ficult. The regulations provide that property is not to be valued in "a mar-
ket other than that in which such item is most commonly sold to the public,
taking into account the location of the item wherever appropriate." '152
Where property "is generally obtained by the public in the retail market, the
fair market value of such an item of property is the price at which the item
... would be sold at retail."'15 3 The regulations then give the example of an
automobile, and indicate that because it is commonly obtained by the public
in the retail market, that market should be used in assigning value to a car in
the decedent's estate. 54 This language is arguably the best justification for
the IRS's use of retail street value in assigning value to several bales of
marijuana in the hands of a drug dealer/smuggler.
Under the facts of TAM 92-07-004, however, the use of retail street
value is inappropriate, because that is not the market in which a wholesale
distributor would sell his drugs. Although the above-mentioned use of re-
tail values is appropriate for household possessions such as a used automo-
bile, which would be purchased at retail value from a vendor of used cars, it
is inappropriate where the items or their composition represent goods an
individual would not purchase in the retail market. For example, although a
decedent's personal automobile should be valued at retail, if the decedent
were also a wholesaler of used automobiles, those cars should be valued in
152. Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-1(b) (as amended in 1965).
153. Id.
154. Id.
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the market in which they would be sold-the wholesale used car market. 55
Consistent with this conclusion, the regulations state that where a party
gives property to a charity, the market to be used for purposes of determin-
ing the amount of an income tax deduction is the market in which the donor
normally would sell the property.' 56 Moreover, the quantity of the property
given should also be considered in determining such value. 157 The regula-
tion states that "[t]he usual market of a manufacturer or other producer
consists of the wholesalers or other distributors to or through whom he cus-
tomarily sells, unless he sells only at retail in which event it is his retail
customers."'
158
In Anselmo v. Commissioner,'59 a classic bulk gem purchase tax shel-
ter case, the Tax Court was called on to value 461 low grade unset gems
that the taxpayer had purchased in bulk for $15,000 and, nine months later,
had given to the Smithsonian Museum, claiming a charitable contribution
deduction under I.R.C. § 170160 based on their alleged $80,680 retail
value.161 The Tax Court first acknowledged that the same principles ap-
plied to determining valuation for estate, gift, and income tax purposes. 162
It then sought to explain the apparent conflict between the retail market
reference in Regulation section 20.2031-1(b) and the reference to wholesale
values in Regulation section 1.170A-1(c)(2). 163
The IRS anxiously pressed the use of wholesale bulk values for § 170
purposes, based largely on the reference in Regulation section
1.170A-1(c)(2) to such values." 4 The Tax Court noted that the use of such
values was appropriate where the donor was a dealer who normally sold
such property in bulk at wholesale to other dealers. 165 Because Anselmo
was a lawyer and not a dealer in gems, that regulation was not controlling
concerning the market in which his goods were to be valued. 166
155. See Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-3 (as amended in 1992) (indicating that business assets are to
be valued at their appraised value). This presumably means that business inventory is to be valued
as inventory and not at its retail value. See also Rev. Proc. 77-12, 1977-1 C.B. 569, which, by
using the cost of reproduction method as one of the acceptable methods for valuing inventory,
most clearly indicates that producers and wholesalers are not expected to value inventory at retail.
Id. at 569.
156. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-l(c)(2) (as amended in 1990).
157. Id.
158. Id. § 1.170A-l(c)(1).
159. 80 T.C. 872 (1983), aff'd, 757 F.2d 1208 (11th Cir. 1985).
160. I.R.C. § 170 (1988 & Supp. M 1991).
161. Anselmo, 80 T.C. at 873-76.
162. Id. at 881.
163. Id. at 881-84.
164. Id. at 883.
165. Id. at 884.
166. Id.
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In discussing the application of Regulation section 20.2031-1(b), the
Tax Court noted that unset gems of the quality the taxpayer bought were
rarely, if ever, sold to individual customers in jewelry, discount, or depart-
ment stores. 167 Such stones were typically sold to manufacturing or retail
jewelers who set the stones for eventual sale to retail customers. 161 The
court found that the appropriate market for valuing the taxpayer's unset low
quality gems was the wholesale market, because that market was the nearest
thing to a "'market ... in which such item is most commonly sold to the
public.' v7169
Applying the reasoning of Anselmo to the facts in TAM 92-07-004, a
strong argument can be made that the use of "retail street value" is inappro-
priate for valuing a bulk supply of 662.5 pounds of baled marijuana in the
hands of a smuggler. 7° At retail these goods are not sold in bales, but in
small packets of an ounce or less. 7 ' Presumably the baled marijuana was
to be sold to suppliers who were to sell it to others in the chain of distribu-
tion. Regulation section 1.170A-1(c)(2) indicates that in such a case the
value to the taxpayer's customers is the appropriate value to use. 172  Since
vast mark-ups occur with contraband as it makes its way from smuggler to
eventual retail customers, 73 use of retail street value results in a vast over-
statement of the fair market value of these assets in a decedent's estate.
Use of retail street value for valuing the marijuana in TAM 92-07-004
should be rejected as inconsistent with the Tax Court's disposition of An-
selmo. Since sale of marijuana to the public at retail requires its division
into small packages, the bales of marijuana in the possession of the dece-
dent were much like the unset gems in the hands of taxpayer Anselmo.
Their only real market for sale to customers was the wholesale drug market,
where they would be sold at a fraction of their retail street value.' 74 To
167. Id. at 877.
168. Id. at 876-78, 882.
169. Id. at 881 (quoting Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-1(b) (as amended in 1965)).
170. In TAM 92-07-004, supra note 5, at 16,954, the IRS noted that federal and local law
enforcement authorities had long suspected the taxpayer of drug smuggling. Id. Furthermore,
although he was never arrested for drug smuggling, the decedent, on several occasions, had been
arrested and convicted of offenses "involving airplanes and airplane equipment used in drug
smuggling." Id.
171. Given that in 1991 an ounce of marijuana was selling for as much as $550, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUsTIcE, ILtuaAL DRUG PRicE/PuRr REPORT 5 (1992), one can readily infer that most users of
marijuana will not purchase more than one ounce at a time.
172. See Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-l(c)(2) (as amended in 1990).
173. See infra note 174.
174. The mark-up in the illicit drug market from wholesale to retail can be considerable. It
appears to be greatest in the case of diazepam (Valium), where the mark-up can be as much as
tenfold. See U.S. DEPT. OF JusTIcE, supra note 171, at 11. The Department of Justice's report
compares marijuana prices at pound quantities and ounce quantities, rather than at wholesale and
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value these bales at their retail street value would be comparable to valuing
inventory in the hands of a manufacturer at retail value, or valuing a large
tract of undeveloped land at its value as subdivided building lots. I7 1
The Treasury states in TAM 92-07-004 that it is under no obligation to
assume that a taxpayer will sell drugs in the lowest market; rather, it is free
to presume that the drugs will be sold in the market that will yield the
highest price. 176 A problem with the use of this approach to justify resort to
retail values on the facts of the TAM is that marijuana is not sold in bales in
retail street transactions. Furthermore, TAM 92-07-004 characterizes the
decedent as a smuggler and not as a street-level dealer. 1 77 One possible
explanation for the IRS's approach to the issue is its desire to force estates
like that involved to disclose fully the nature of the decedent's activities-
as a smuggler at wholesale-to avoid retail valuation. This disclosure
might result in the forfeiture of all of the decedent's other property holdings
retail. In 1991, the price of one ounce at the "ounce level" was as much as three times greater
than an ounce at the "pound level." See id. at 5.
175. Although the IRS, in the absence of specific statutory mandate to the contrary, e.g.,
I.R.C. § 2032A (1988 & Supp. Im 1991) (detailing rules for qualifying real property for valuation
purposes), is obliged to tax a decedent's estate at its highest and best use, there is no justification
for its recasting the form and character of the owned interests subject to tax. For example,
although the IRS, in the absence of the applicability of § 2032A, is free to value farm land at its
value as residential property, it is not free to value farm land at its subdivided improved value
where such subdivision and improvement has not occurred.
176. The Treasury cited several income tax cases as supporting its position that "retail street
value" should be used in valuing the stolen marijuana. See Jones v. Commissioner, 61 T.C.M.
(CCH) 1721, 1727 (1991); Caffery v. Commissioner, 60 T.C.M. (CCH) 807, 809-10 (1990); Costa
v. Commissioner, 60 T.C.M. (CCH) 1178, 1180 (1990). TAM 92-07-004 appears to have miscon-
strued and misapplied these cases. In Jones, the taxpayer was a distributer of cocaine who
purchased from smugglers and sold to wholesalers. In estimating the taxpayer's income from a 42
kilo purchase of cocaine, the Tax Court found that the selling price "to a wholesale dealer for a
pound of cocaine ranged from approximately $32,000 to $44,800." It thus approved a value of
$40,000 per pound in estimating the taxpayer's receipts for the sale of the 42 kilos of cocaine,
erroneously characterizing this as a "retail street-value." Jones, 61 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1727. The
IRS has seized on this misuse of the term "retail" in characterizing sales to wholesalers to justify
use of retail values. See TAM 92-07-004, supra note 5, at 16,956-57. Similarly, in Costa, retail
versus wholesale value and the position of the wrongdoer within the illegal drug industry was
never really at issue. The taxpayer in that case was a woman married to a drug dealer. The court
held that she escaped tax liability for her husband's drug dealings under the innocent spouse rule.
Costa, 60 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1190-92. In Caffery, the taxpayer in question purchased marijuana for
$230 per pound and had his income from its sale determined based on an estimated $250 per
pound "street value." Caffery, 60 T.C.M. (CCH) at 809. The Tax Court, it should be noted, did
not use the term "retail," and indeed, its characterization of the taxpayer's activity is insufficient to
enable one to determine exactly his place in the chain of distribution. Id. at 808-09. The modest
mark-up of his drugs does indicate that the case did not involve an attempt to calculate the tax-
payer's income by determining his receipts based on placing him at an inappropriate level in the
chain of distribution.
177. See supra notes 50-51, 170 and accompanying text.
ESTATE TAXATION
under state and federal forfeiture laws.'78 Laudable as such a goal may be,
it does not justify inappropriate valuation methods. Where, as in TAM
92-07-004, the facts as recited by the IRS indicate the status of the decedent
to be that of a smuggler of marijuana in a form that can only be sold at
wholesale, those drugs should be valued in the wholesale market. 179
C. Summary
The following general observations with respect -to valuation of the
fruits of crime includible in an estate are in order. First, because of their
nature as "hot property," these assets are valued in their own special mar-
kets. In the case of stolen property, its lack of clear title will most likely
result in its having a market value a good deal less than its value in the
legitimate market to a holder with good title. In the case of contraband such
as narcotics, the illicit market value may in many circumstances vastly ex-
ceed legitimate market value. For example, cocaine can be purchased by
pharmaceutical companies operating in the legal pharmaceutical market for
a fraction of its value in the illicit market. 180
Another point that these TAM make clear is that, in valuing property
in the illicit marketplace, it is essential to determine at what stage in the
distribution chain the goods are to be valued. Determination of the appro-
priate level requires one to determine the customer base for goods of the
character and form held by the decedent. Thus, in determining value for the
fruits of criminal activity, we should be applying the same valuation princi-
ples used to value other comparable property legally held by the taxpayer.
178. For a discussion demonstrating the vastness of the scope of forfeiture legislation at the
federal and state levels, see DAvID SmrrH, PRosEclriON AND DEFnNss OF FoRFErruRE CASES
(1985).
179. In closing this discussion of the IRS's insistence on use of the highest market value
(either retail or wholesale), it is worth noting the inconsistency of its presumption that the mari-
juana was "average" and not highest grade. Compare TAM 92-07-004, supra note 5, at 16,956-57
(arguing that the marijuana should be valued at its highest price) with id. (citing Kent v. Commis-
sioner, 51 T.C.M. (CCH) 1605 (1986), and arguing that the marijuana should be presumed to be of
average quality). Perhaps the Service feels compelled to adopt this more lenient posture on the
quality issue, since governmental authorities, by their destruction of the contraband, had effec-
tively precluded the taxpayer's estate from introducing evidence as to quality.
180. The reason illegal drugs are so expensive is that they are illegal. Consumers pay high
prices for such drugs not because of high production costs, but because suppliers must endure
considerable risk to provide the drugs. Because pharmaceutical companies need not fear losing
entire shipments to drug enforcement officials or facing criminal prosecution, they can afford to
accept a much smaller profit margin than their outlaw counterparts. See James Cook, The Para-
dox of Antidrug Enforcement, FoRBEs, Nov. 13, 1989, at 110.
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IV. DEDUCTmIrrY AFmR RETURN OR FoRrruRE
Both TAM 91-52-005 and TAM 92-07-004 deal with the issue of
whether a deduction should be allowed under either § 2053181 or § 2054182
when an estate that includes the fruits of crime returns such property to its
rightful owner, or surrenders it to authorities who seize it acting pursuant to
forfeiture legislation. As this article has noted, in TAM 91-52-005 the IRS
ruled that because, under Texas law, claims could no longer be filed against
the decedent's estate, no deduction could be allowed under § 2053 when the
stolen property was returned to the "true owner." 18 3 In TAM 92-07-004,
the IRS disallowed a deduction under either § 2053 or § 2054 on the basis
that allowing a deduction for the loss of confiscated marijuana would un-
dermine national public policy against trafficking in controlled sub-
stances.' 84 This section discusses the appropriateness of the IRS's
resolution of these issues. The application of the public policy doctrine will
be explored first, since its broad applicability will often moot discussion of
other issues.
A. A Brief History of the Public Policy Doctrine
The use of a public policy rationale to disallow deductions has a some-
what checkered history.'8 5 Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Tank
Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner,'86 the Court flirted with, but never
fully embraced, the idea of denying deductions based squarely on the
ground that allowance of a deduction for a particular expenditure under the
income tax would violate public policy.187 In Tank Truck Rentals the tax-
payer, an interstate shipper of liquids, intentionally operated trucks that ex-
ceeded Pennsylvania weight limits.' 88 For reasons of safety and
181. I.R.C. § 2053 (1988).
182. LR.C. § 2054 (1988).
183. See supra notes 44-48 and accompanying text.
184. See supra notes 64-71 and accompanying text.
185. See Andrew Shoemaker, Note, The Smuggler's Blues: Wood v. United States and the
Resulting Horizontal Inequity Among Criminals in the Allowance of Federal Income Tax Deduc-
tions, 11 VA. TAx Rnv. 659, 665-75 (1992); Robert Peace & Carl Messere, Tax Deductions and
Criminal Activities: The Effects of Recent Tax Legislation, 20 RutrGERs LJ. 415,418-429 (1989);
Cathryn Deal, Reining in the Unruly Horse: The Public Policy Test for Disallowing Tax Deduc-
tions, 9 VT. L. Ray. 11, 17-38 (1984); George Tyler, Disallowance of Deductions on Public
Policy Grounds, 20 TAx L. Rnv. 665 passim (1965).
186. 356 U.S. 30 (1958).
187. See, e.g., Clarke v. Haberle Crystal Springs Brewing Co., 280 U.S. 384, 386-87 (1930);
United States v. Sullivan, 274 U.S. 259, 264 (1927).
188. Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner, 26 T.C. 427, 433 (1956) aff'd, 356 U.S. 30
(1958).
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economy,1 9 the taxpayer chose to pay occasional fines rather than to oper-
ate trucks that complied with state law. In denying a business expense de-
duction under § 162190 for the fines, the Court observed:
Petitioner's failure to comply with the state laws obviously was
based on a balancing of the cost of compliance against the chance
of detection. Such a course cannot be sanctioned, for judicial def-
erence to state action requires, whenever possible, that a State not
be thwarted in its policy. We will not presume that the Congress,
in allowing deductions for income tax purposes, intended to en-
courage a business enterprise to violate the declared policy of a
State. To allow the deduction sought here would but encourage
continued violations of state law by increasing the odds in favor
of noncompliance. This could only tend to destroy the effective-
ness of the State's maximum weight laws.
19 1
Unfortunately, the Court in Tank Truck Rentals provided no clear stan-
dard for determining when an illegal payment or a payment related to ille-
gal activities should be disallowed based on a public policy rationale. In
the years that followed, this resulted in a series of uneven decisions by
lower court judges. 92
Dissatisfaction with these results led Congress in 1969 to enact spe-
cific statutory guidelines disallowing deductions in prescribed circum-
stances. Congress provided specific guidance with respect to the
deductibility of antitrust treble damages, 193 fines and penalties, 194 as well as
illegal bribes and kickbacks. 195 This legislation originated in the Senate. 196
The Senate Finance Committee, in explaining the reasons for the change,
noted the lack of congressional guidance for application of the public policy
189. Because of the weight of some of the liquids transported in the taxpayer's trucks, the only
way to have complied with the weight limits would have entailed operating trucks that were only
partially full. See id Such a practice was undesirable "by reason of he unsafe and hazardous
condition which the surge in such partially loaded tanks created in stopping the motor vehicles and
in negotiating the equipment around the curves of the highways." Id. at 434.
190. I.R.C. § 162 (West Supp. 1993).
191. Tank Truck Rentals, 356 U.S. at 34-35.
192. See Tyler, supra note 185, at 675-96 (comparing, inter alia, National Outdoor Advertis-
ing Bureau, Inc. v. Helvering, 89 F.2d 878 (2d Cir. 1937), overruled by Tellier v. Commissioner,
342 F.2d 690 (2d Cir. 1965), and Dixie Mach. Welding & Metal Works, Inc. v. United States, 315
F.2d 439 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 950 (1963); with Kirtz v. United States, 304 F.2d 460
(CL Cl. 1962); United States v. Winters, 261 F.2d 675 (10th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 943
(1959); and Stacy v. United States, 231 F. Supp. 304 (S.D. Miss. 1963)).
193. I.R.C. § 162(g) (1988).
194. I.R.C. § 162(f) (1988).
195. I.R.C. § 162(c) (1988).
196. See CoNF. REP. No. 782, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 331, 332 (1969), reprinted in 1969
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2392, 2447.
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doctrine.19 7 The foregoing changes, the Committee noted, were intended to
rectify that situation." 8 The Committee then stated that "[t]he provision for
the denial of the deduction for payments in these situations which are
deemed to violate public policy is intended to be all inclusive. Public pol-
icy, in other circumstances, generally is not sufficiently clearly defined to
justify the disallowance of deductions."'199
The Treasury subsequently amended its regulations to indicate that,
except as provided by Congress in §§ 162(c), (f), and (g), the public policy
doctrine would no longer be used to disallow otherwise allowable deduc-
tions under § 162.100 The IRS, however, has taken the position that the
1969 Congressional restriction of the public policy doctrine applies only to
deductions under § 162.201 It asserts, with the support of the judiciary, that
the public policy doctrine is alive and well in other sections of the Code.202
For example, in Holt v. Commissioner,"3 the IRS had stipulated that a drug
dealer taxpayer should be allowed a deduction for the cost of goods sold
(marijuana), as well as various business expenses such as sales commis-
sions, drivers expenses, and legal and professional fees. The taxpayer
197. See S. REP. No. 552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 274 (1969), reprinted in 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2027, 2311.
198. kI.
199. Id. The Senate Finance Committee restated its position in 1971 when amending I.R.C.
§ 162. S. REP. No. 437, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 72 (1971), reprinted in 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1918,
states that "the determination of when a deduction should be denied should remain under the
control of Congress." Id. at 1979.
200. See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-1(a) (as amended in 1988), stating: "A deduction for an expense
paid or incurred after December 30, 1969, which would otherwise be allowable under § 162 shall
not be denied on the grounds that allowance of such deduction would frustrate a sharply defined
public policy."
201. See Rev. Rul. 77-126, 1977-1 C.B. 47.
202. See, e.g., Wood v. United States, 863 F.2d 417, 420-22 (5th Cir. 1989) (disallowing a
deduction claimed under LR.C. § 165 for forfeited drug smuggling proceeds); Bob Jones Univ. v.
United States, 639 F.2d 147, 157 (4th Cir. 1980) (Widener, J., dissenting) (suggesting that the
public policy doctrine could, theoretically, be used to revoke a charitable organization's
tax-exempt status under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1988)); Blackman v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 677,
682-83 (1987) (holding that the taxpayer was not entitled to a § 165(c)(3) casualty loss deduction
where the taxpayer had deliberately ignited a pile of his wife's clothes, thus causing his residence
to bum, on the ground that to allow such a deduction would violate Maryland's public policies
against arson and domestic violence, and stating that "[w]e refuse to encourage couples to settle
their disputes with fire"); Holmes Enters., Inc. v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 114, 115-18 (1977)
(holding that the taxpayer was not entitled to a deduction under either § 165(a) or § 123 1(a) when
the taxpayer's sole shareholder was convicted of marijuana possession and forced to forfeit an
automobile because allowing such a deduction would frustrate public policy).
On occasion, the Tax Court has expressed the concern that congressional action in 1969
might have, in essence, terminated the public policy doctrine not just in § 162, but in all other
sections of the Code. See Medeiros v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 1255, 1262 n.8 (1981). Still, the
Tax Court has never embraced this position in its opinions, which are to the contrary.
203. 69 T.C. 75 (1977).
ESTATE TAXATION
claimed a deduction under either § 16224 or § 165205 for forfeited drugs
and a forfeited truck and trailer used to transport the drugs. The Tax Court
found that the drugs and transportation equipment could not qualify as de-
ductible expenditures under § 162.206 The Court also denied a deduction
for their loss under § 165 based on the fact that allowance of such a deduc-
tion would frustrate a well-defined national policy against trafficking in
controlled substances.2 ' 7 Similarly, in Wood v. United States,208 the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals denied a loss deduction under I.R.C. § 165 to a
drug dealer who was required to forfeit profits from drug-dealing conducted
in past years.209 The court rested its decision squarely on the public policy
rationale of Tank Truck Rentals.210 Given the well defined public policy
against dealing in drugs as embodied in the nation's drug laws, the court
denied the taxpayer's claim for an income tax loss under § 165 due to the
forfeiture of the fruits of his drug smuggling operation.21 '
The most recent chapter in the legislative history of the public policy
doctrine was written in 1982, when Congress belatedly discovered that the
1969 amendments to § 162 compelled the IRS to allow drug dealers busi-
ness deductions for items such as telephone, automobile, and rental expend-
itures. 12 It reacted sharply by adding § 280E to the Code, which disallows
a deduction for amounts paid or incurred in carrying on a trade or business
consisting of trafficking in controlled substances.213
One may infer from the foregoing brief history of the public policy
doctrine that the judiciary is likely to sustain the Commissioner's applica-
tion of the doctrine to deny a deduction under § 2053 or § 2054 in drug
forfeiture situations. Presumably, application of the doctrine will not be
limited to forfeitures involving controlled substances and the instrumentali-
ties of trafficking in them, but will, if Wood is a guide, extend to forfeitures
of legal goods that are purchased with the profits from dealing in controlled
substances.
One of the real difficulties with the public policy doctrine is determin-
ing the precise extent of its application. For example, should the doctrine
204. I.R.C. § 162 (West Supp. 1993).
205. I.R.C. § 165 (1988).
206. Holt, 69 T.C. at 78.
207. Id. at 79-81.
208. 863 F.2d 417 (5th Cir. 1989).
209. Id. at 420-22.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. See S. REP. No. 494, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 309 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N.
781, 1050; cf. Holt v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 75, 77 (1977) (denying a § 165 deduction to
drug-dealers for tools of their trade that the government had confiscated).
213. See I.R.C. § 280E (1988).
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be applied in the case of all forfeitures 214 (e.g., those resulting from illegal
gambling, racketeering, moonshining, and dealing in narcotics) or just those
involving trafficking in controlled substances? Similarly, does it undermine
national policy against theft and dealing in stolen property to allow a deduc-
tion to holders of stolen property who are compelled to return the property
to its rightful owner?
Application of the doctrine in other areas of the Code involves the
same issues that were raised by its application under § 162. The lack of
clearly articulated standards as to what types of illegal activities are worthy
of the added sanction of deduction disallowance results in arbitrary judicial
outcomes.215 For example, although the Tax Court found that allowing a
deduction for restitution of embezzled funds would undermine a national
policy against embezzlement, 216 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals did
not share the Tax Court's finely honed sense of moral outrage over this
crime and allowed the deduction.217 Why embezzlement does not trigger
disallowance of a loss deduction under § 165 based on a public policy anal-
ysis but illegal gambling,218 dealing in stolen property,219 and arson 220 do is
hard to explain.221
The arbitrary imposition of the public policy disallowance doctrine is
compounded by the fact that, once imposed, the impact of the sanction
largely depends on a variety of other factors, such as the tax bracket of the
214. For a good discussion of the extensiveness of the forfeiture laws, see SMrrH, supra note
178.
215. See Tyler, supra note 185, at 675-96.
216. See Stephens v. Commissioner, 93 T.C. 108, 112-13 (1989), rev'd, 905 F.2d 667 (2d Cir.
1990).
217. See Stephens v. Commissioner, 905 F.2d 667, 670-74 (2d Cir. 1990).
218. See Farris v. Commissioner, 50 T.C.M. (CCH) 412,415-17 (1985), aft'd, 823 F.2d 1552
(9th Cir. 1987) (disallowing losses relating to FBI's seizure of cash and gambling equipment).
219. See Lincoln v. Commissioner, 50 T.C.M. (CCH) 185, 188-89 (1985) (disallowing loss
where taxpayer paid money to purchase stolen money at a discount, but was swindled, and never
received any stolen money).
220. See Blackman v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 677, 682-83 (1987), aff'd, 867 F.2d 605 (1st
Cir. 1988). For a brief description of this case, see supra note 202.
221. A proponent of Critical Legal Studies might suggest that the lenient treatment of embez-
zlement has more to do with the class background of most perpetrators of this white collar crime
than it does with any substantive distinctions one can develop. For a discussion of various recur-
ring themes in Critical Legal Studies writing, see MARK Km.MAm, A GUIDE TO CRMIcAL LOAL
STUDIEs (1987).
A second explanation of the difference in treatment could be that the Supreme Court in
James, by way of dictum, indicated that an embezzler who included the fruits of his crime in
income and then returned embezzled funds would presumably be entitled to a deduction for the
returned funds. See James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213, 220 (1961). The Second Circuit, how-
ever, did not refer to this distinction in a recent decision, in which it allowed an embezzler to
deduct amounts repaid to the rightful owners. See Stephens v. Commissioner, 905 F.2d 667 (2d
Cir. 1990).
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taxpayer and the availability of other deductions. For example, take the
hypothetical case of an estate that holds $300,000 of legally derived assets
and $200,000 of illegal drugs which were seized by the government at the
decedent's death. Since this is a non-taxable estate,222 application of the
public policy doctrine to disallow a deduction for the seized assets would
result in no added sanction. If, however, the estate, in addition to the
$300,000 of legally derived assets, held $1,200,000 of seized drugs, pay-
ment of the resulting net $363,000223 in estate tax due would totally bank-
rupt the estate.224
Nonetheless, despite any such concerns with arbitrariness, so long as
the judiciary's sense of indignity is offended, the history of the public pol-
icy doctrine does not indicate that the courts are likely to reject its applica-
tion outside of the confines of § 162. Moreover, given Congress's passage
of § 280E2z to deny the allowance of a business expense deduction for
traffickers in controlled substances, and the judiciary's consistently tough
treatment of drug dealers under § 165,226 it is fair to assume that, although
inconsistent judicial dispositions might be obtained in the case of other
crimes, a fairly well articulated and consistent policy is in place with re-
spect to those who deal in controlled substances. The judiciary, thus, can at
least be expected to use the public policy doctrine to deny deductions in all
cases involving drug trafficking.227
B. Section 2054: Deduction for Losses
Let us assume that fruits of criminal activity are properly included in
the estate at the correct value and that: (1) stolen property is returned to its
rightful owner or (2) property associated with criminal activities is forfeited
222. The availability of the $192,800 unified credit under I.R.C. § 2010 in essence creates a
$600,000 exemption, with the result that no tax is due. LR.C. § 2010 (1988 & Supp. 1I 1991).
223. Under I.R.C. § 2001 (1988), a total tax of $555,800 would be due on the $1,500,000
estate, which after subtracting the $192,800 unified credit provided by I.R.C. § 2010 (1988 &
Supp. 11 1991) would result in a net tax liability of $363,000. This amount would have to be paid
out of the $300,000 of legally acquired assets remaining after forfeiture.
224. This should in no way be viewed as an unusual phenomenon when dealing with forfeit-
ures. See Christine Meyer, Zero Tolerance for Forfeiture: A Call for Reform of Civil Forfeiture
Law, 5 NoTmR D/rm J.L. ETmcs & PUB. POL'Y 853, 857 (1991) (observing that the forfeiture
penalty for purchasers of marijuana can vary considerably depending on whether the customer
drives a luxury car, a jalopy, or walks).
225. See supra notes 212-13 and accompanying text.
226. See, e.g., Wood v. United States, 863 F.2d 417, 420-22 (5th Cir. 1989); Holt v. Commis-
sioner, 69 T.C. 75, 79-81 (1977), aff'd, 611 F.2d 1160 (5th Cir. 1980). For discussion of these
cases, see supra notes 203-11 and accompanying text.
227. It is interesting that the disallowance of some expenses previously deductible under
§ 162 and the requirement that they be capitalized under § 263A might result in the disallowance
of any claim for deduction under § 263A, on public policy grounds, for amounts that would have
been allowed as a deduction under § 162.
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to governmental authorities. It is then appropriate to determine if a deduc-
tion should be allowed under § 2054, which provides a deduction for
"losses incurred during the settlement of estates arising from fires, storms,
shipwrecks, or other casualties, or from theft, when such losses are not
compensated for by insurance or otherwise." '228 Only the term "other casu-
alties" could ever remotely be construed as applying to such returns or for-
feitures of property. Since scant authority exists under § 2054 construing
the meaning of this term,22 9 one must resort to authorities that construe the
term under § 165(c)(3), which provides an identical deduction under the
income tax.230
It is well established under § 165(c)(3) that, in order for events to be
deemed "other casualties," they must possess characteristics that are similar
to those of fires, storms, shipwrecks, and thefts.2"' The courts and the IRS
have generally required that for an act to be deemed a casualty, it must be
sudden, unexpected, and unusual.232 Using such a standard, it is difficult to
characterize as a casualty the return of stolen property to the true owner by
a possessor who is discovered to be holding such goods. Moreover, it is
generally agreed that confiscations of property by a foreign government act-
ing under color of law2 33 and forfeitures of illegally held goods to lawful
authorities234 do not constitute "casualties" as that term is used in
§ 165(c)(3). 235 For example, in Powers v. Commissioner236 the taxpayer's
car was confiscated by East German officials because he allegedly lacked
proper documentation necessary for export of the vehicle from West Berlin
228. .LR.C. § 2054 (1988).
229. Sm'HENs, supra note 80, 5.04[2].
230. Section 165(c)(3) provides a deduction for "losses of property not connected with a trade
or business or a transaction entered into for profit, if such losses arise from fire, storm, shipwreck,
or other casualty, or from theft." I.R.C. § 165(c)(3) (1988).
231. See 2 BrrrKE, supra note 74, 34.2.
232. For a list of relevant cases, including Fay v. Helvering, 120 F.2d 253 (2d Cir. 1941), see
2 BrrrnR, supra note 74, 34.2 n.4. The IRS's position is best set forth in Rev. Rul. 72-592,
1972-2 C.B. 101.
233. See Mozayeny v. Commissioner, 53 T.C.M. (CCH) 566, 568 (1987); Richter v. Commis-
sioner, 24 T.C.M. (CCH) 461, 462 (1965); Powers v. Commissioner, 36 T.C. 1191, 1192-93
(1961); Gurry v. Commissioner, 27 B.T.A. 1237, 1238 (1933).
234. See Formel v. Commissioner, 9 T.C.M. (CCH) 782, 786-87 (1950); Hughes v. Commis-
sioner, I B.T.A. 944, 945-46 (1925). The opinions in both Formel and Hughes imply that even
illegal seizures by authorities are not casualties. Id.
235. Although confiscations of investment assets or property used in a trade or business can-
not qualify for deduction under the income tax under § 165(c)(3), they can qualify for deduction
under § 165(c)(1) or § 165(c)(2) as losses incurred in a transaction entered into for profit or in a
trade or business. I.R.C. § 165(c)(1)-(3) (1988); see Benichou v. Commissioner, 29 T.C.M.
(CCH) 1156, 1162-65 (1970). Section 2054 provides no deduction for such losses. I.R.C. § 2054
(1988).
236. 36 T.C. 1191 (1961).
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through East Germany to the West. The Tax Court, though characterizing
the East German action as despotic, rejected a claimed casualty loss deduc-
tion because the confiscation lacked the requisite element of "chance, acci-
dent or contingency" that the court determined characterized a casualty.237
In light of Powers and other similarly narrow readings of the casualty
loss deduction in the cases of confiscations and forfeitures, 38 it is hard to
conceive of a forfeiture of the instrumentalities of crime or of the fruits of
criminal activities that would qualify for casualty loss treatment. Such
seizures, though they might be sudden, can hardly be deemed unexpected or
unusual. Because forfeitures should not qualify for deduction under
§ 2054, it is surprising that the IRS even considered the possibility of its
application in TAM 92-07-004 before disposing of the deduction issue by
resorting to the public policy doctrine. 3 9
C. Section 2053(a)(3): Deduction for Claims Against the Estate
Section 2053(a)(3) of the Code provides that "the value of the taxable
estate shall be determined by deducting from the value of the gross estate
such amounts... for claims against the estate.., as are allowable by the
laws of the jurisdiction... under which the estate is being administered."'24
It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss all the possible applications
of § 2053(a)(3) to forfeitures and returns of stolen property. This paper
shall therefore concentrate on one of the most interesting issues regarding
§ 2053(a)(3) as it applies to such returns and forfeitures.
One major unresolved issue under § 2053(a)(3) is whether the use of
the word "allowable," as contrasted with "allowed," indicates that actual
payment of the claim is not essential for deduction of a claim under
§ 2053(a)(3).241 With a degree of judicial approval, the IRS takes the posi-
tion, as it did in TAM 91-52-005, that actual payment is required for deduc-
237. kld at 1193.
238. An exception to this appeared in I.R.C. § 165(i) (repealed 1976), under which certain
confiscations by the Castro government in Cuba qualified for casualty loss treatment. Moreover,
casualty losses that occur in the course of a trade or business are allowed as a deduction, not under
§ 165(c)(3), but rather under § 165(c)(1), which allows a deduction for trade or business losses.
LR.C. § 165(c)(1) (1988); see Benichou, 29 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1162-65. Section 2054 provides no
such deduction for trade or business losses experienced by the estate after the decedent's death.
I.R.C. § 2054 (1988).
239. See supra notes 185-227 and accompanying text.
240. I.R.C. § 2053(a)(3) (1988).
241. Deductions for funeral and administration "expenses" that are allowed under
§ 2053(a)(1) and § 2053(a)(2) do not provoke this controversy. Use of the word "expense" in
those sections has insured that deductions for funeral and administration expenses will be permit-
ted only for actual outlays of money or property for these items. See SraPHENs Er AL., supra note
80, 5.03[3].
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tion of a claim under § 2053(a)(3).242 In Revenue Ruling 60-247, the IRS
articulated its position on this issue:
A deduction... will not be allowed for claims against the estate
which have not been paid or will not be paid because the creditor
waives payment, fails to file his claim within the time limit and
under the conditions prescribed by applicable local law, or other-
wise fails to enforce payment.243
Several scholars, also with judicial support, take the contrary position
that payment is not a prerequisite for deduction of a claim under
§ 2053(a)(3). 24 These authorities assert that, unless the Code provides
otherwise, the estate tax is generally intended to be imposed on a "snap-
shot" of the net value of the decedent's estate at date of death. Thus a
deduction should be permitted for claims allowable at death even if they are
never paid, or are satisfied for an amount less than their perceived value at
death.
While it is beyond the scope of this article to attempt to resolve this
dispute, it might be useful to make several observations regarding the treat-
ment, under both of these schools of thought, of claims for return of stolen
property and forfeitures of the instrumentalities and fruits of criminal activ-
ity. First, it should be noted that there are circumstances where resolution
of the deduction issue does not turn on whether one believes that payment
of a claim in full is a prerequisite for deduction of the full amount of the
claim. For example, application of the public policy doctrine will work to
disallow a deduction under § 2053(a)(3) for both forfeited and "forfeitable"
illegal drugs and the fruits of drug trafficking. Second, if one is dealing
with a return or forfeiture of property where there will be no disallowance
based on public policy considerations, a deduction should be allowed if the
return or forfeiture was required by local law and was actually accom-
plished during administration of the estate. For example, a deduction
should be allowed for the timely return of stolen property to the "true
242. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 60-247, 1960-2 C.B. 272; Gowetz v. Commissioner, 320 F.2d 874,
876 (1st Cir. 1963); Estate of Courtney v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 317, 322-23 (1974); Estate of
Hagmann v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 465, 467-69 (1973), afydper curiam, 492 F.2d 796 (5th Cir.
1974); Estate of Shedd v. Commissioner, 37 T.C. 394, 398 (1961), afTfd, 320 F.2d 638 (9th Cir.
1963).
243. Rev. Rul. 60-247, 1960-2 C.B. 272.
244. See SEm'Ns Er AL., supra note 80, 5.03[5]; Craig S. Palmquist, The Estate Tax
Deductibility of Unenforced Claims Against a Decedent's Estate, 11 GoNz. L. Rav. 707, 717-19
(1976). Several cases also support this proposition. See Estate of Van Home v. Commissioner,
720 F.2d 1114, 1116-17 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 980 (1984); Propstra v. United
States, 680 F.2d 1248, 1254-57 (9th Cir. 1982); Wilder v. Commissioner, 581 F. Supp. 86, 88
(N.D. Ohio 1983); Greene v. United States, 447 F. Supp. 885, 894-95 (N.D. Ill. 1978); Russell v.
United States, 260 F. Supp. 493, 499-500 (N.D. 11. 1966); Winer v. United States, 153 F. Supp.
941, 943-44 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
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owner" during administration of the estate. The same result should follow
if, for example, the decedent died possessing goods that were subject to
claims by customs authorities who, at the decedent's death, were seeking to
have the property destroyed for violation of customs rules involving crimi-
nal sanctions. If property is confiscated and destroyed during the adminis-
tration of the estate, a deduction should be allowed under § 2053(a)(3).
Substantial variations in results could occur, however, where claims
that do not fall under the public policy disallowance doctrine go unpaid by
the estate, or are settled for less than their full value. The IRS and other
adherents of the "allowed" school would then limit deduction to the amount
the estate paid on the claim. The result in TAM 91-52-005 is consistent
with this position, since the Meador estate never returned the stolen art
works to their rightful owner during the administration of the estate under
Texas law. Under the "allowable" doctrine, however, it might be possible
to assert that at the decedent's death he held the stolen property that was
subject to an "allowable," but not "allowed," claim for its return by the true
owner, and hence a deduction should be permitted.'4a
There are several criticisms one could make of this suggestion. First,
since knowledge of the stolen property's location by the "true owner" is a
prerequisite to his or her attempting by law to recover it, an essential fact
necessary for the very existence of the claim as an allowable claim under
state law arguably would not be present. Allowance of a deduction in such
circumstances would be akin to the estate of a surgeon claiming a deduction
for several botched operations that were undetected by patients. Second,
even if one accepts the above line of reasoning, the claim could be valued at
its true "snapshot" value in light of the facts existing at the date of death.
Doing this, we might value the claim as virtually worthless since the "true
owner's" ignorance and the heirs' and executor's seeming determination to
maintain that condition results in the "allowable" claim having a negligible
value. When this negligible value is subtracted from the value of the posses-
sory interest in the stolen property held by the estate, a substantial positive
net value will remain. Given heirs or an executor of an honest disposition,
a dramatically larger value would be assigned to any such claim. Where the
public policy doctrine is not invoked to disallow a claimed deduction, a
similar valuation-centric analysis could be made in the case of forfeitable
fruits of other illegal activities.
An additional interesting issue TAM 91-52-005 presents is the IRS's
assumption that, because the Quedlinburg church did not present its claim
245. Cf. Wilder, 581 F. Supp. at 87-88 (citing Greene v. United States, 447 F. Supp. 885, 894
(N.D. Il. 1978), for the proposition that claims against decedent's estate, paid after the formal
claims period, were deductible under § 2053).
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during the one-year period following the court's issuance of letters testa-
mentary in 1980 and before distribution of the property, no enforceable
claim existed against the estate in 1990.246 The certainty of this conclusion
is questionable in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Tulsa Profes-
sional Collection Services, Inc. v. Pope.'47 In April of 1979, H. Everett
Pope, a resident of Oklahoma, died after a hospitalization of approximately
five months. His estate was probated in Oklahoma. Pursuant to state law,
his wife, as executrix, twice ran a notice to creditors in a Tulsa newspaper
advising them that they had two months from publication of notice to sub-
mit claims. The hospital did not submit a claim.248 Then-existing
Oklahoma law barred creditor claims not submitted to the executor within
two months of the publication of notice.249 The Supreme Court held that,
where a creditor's identity is known to the executor, newspaper notice is
inadequate to satisfy due process requirements. ?50 Rather, the Court main-
tained that, in such circumstances, a procedure that is better calculated to
alert the creditor, such as mail notice, is essential.2"1 The Court noted that
such due process considerations would not arise under a conventional self-
executing statute of limitations,2 2 but went on to hold that due process
would be a factor where state action, such as the involvement of the probate
court, is a necessary element for activation of the time bar on claims.
253
Returning to the Meador case, assuming that the Texas time bar provi-
sions are triggered only by judicial state action and assuming that the dece-
dent's sister, who served as executrix, knew the identity of the true owner
of the stolen treasure, one could conclude that the estate's failure to satisfy
due process requirements with a procedure such as providing mailed notice
to the Quedlinburg church results in the church's claims still being enforce-
able under Texas law. If that were the case, although the stolen art works
were included in Meador's estate, the allowance of a claim under
§ 2053(a)(3) would eliminate all tax liability resulting from inclusion."s4
If one concludes that, pursuant to the "allowable" analysis a deduction
should be permitted under § 2053(a)(3) to the estate of a thief, even if the
property is not returned to the "true owner" during probate, one might con-
246. TAM 91-52-005, supra note 4, at 16,861-62.
247. 485 U.S. 478 (1988).
248. Id. at 482.
249. Id. at 479 (construing OKLA. STAT. tit. 58, § 333 (1981)).
250. Id. at 491.
251. Id.
252. Id. at 486-87.
253. Id. at 487.
254. The facts presented in TAM 91-52-005 are not sufficient to enable one to conclude with
any certainty whether any deficiencies existed in the administration of the estate that would result
in the estate still being open for the filing of valid claims.
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elude that this would result in taxable income to the estate in an amount
equal to the value of the property. Inclusion could be sought under either a
tax benefit, 5  forgiveness of indebtedness," 6 or windfall analysis, 157
although any such efforts by the IRS would face their own statute of limita-
tions problems. Exploration of these income tax issues is beyond the scope
of this article.
V. CONCLUSION
Substantive property law and existing income tax law support the con-
clusion that the fruits of crime to which the estate has a possessory claim
should be included in the taxable estate. Valuation of the interests so
included presents a special challenge that can be met by careful application
of existing theory. In the case of stolen property, this might mean that only
the thief's possessory rights to property in the illicit market are to be val-
ued, and not the "true owner's" rights to the property in the legal market. In
the case of forfeitable property, the value should be determined by compar-
ing it with the value of property of a similar character in the markets in
which such property could be expected to be sold by the holder. Although
there is some possibility that the estate whose value is so enhanced might be
255. The possibility is suggested in 5 Brr=R, supra note 74, 131.4.2 n.18. It is this au-
thor's opinion that, because the claimed deduction which is unpaid is an estate tax and not an
income tax deduction, the tax benefit rule is not applicable.
256. The forgiveness of indebtedness doctrine requires that a borrower whose debt is dis-
charged for less than its face value include in his income the amount forgiven. See 1 BrTrKER,
supra note 74, 6.4. This doctrine, codified in I.R.C. § 61(a)(12) (1988), is consistent with the
widely accepted "Haig-Simons" definition of income: income equals the sum of consumption and
change in net worth. See 1 BrrrKms, supra note 74, 3.1.1. Because any debt forgiven by a
lender increases the borrower's net worth, the borrower has received income. See also I.R.C.
§ 108 (1988 & Supp. II 1991) (relating to discharge of indebtedness income); United States v.
Kirby Lumber Co., 284 U.S. 1, 3 (1931) (holding that a company which issues bonds and then
repurchases them at a lower price receives income equal to the price difference).
Opportunities for application of a true forgiveness of indebtedness rationale would seem to
be quite limited in this context, however. Presumably it should apply only in situations where
return of stolen property or forfeiture was a virtual certainty if a claim was asserted, and those
capable of claiming the property from the estate knew of its location and their right to it, but
preferred, in a non-gift context, not to claim the property.
257. Section 61(a) provides that gross income includes "income from whatever source de-
rived." I.R.C. § 61(a) (1988). Consistent with both the § 61(a) definition and the Haig-Simons
definition, mentioned supra note 256, is the rule that a taxpayer who receives a "windfall" has
received taxable income when such windfall is reduced to "undisputed possession.' 1 Brrrcn,
supra note 74, 5.5 (citing Treas. Reg. § 1.61-14(a) (as amended in 1965)). A taxpayer exper-
iences a windfall when she finds valuable property, such as treasure trove, thus acquiring an asset
without an offsetting liability. See id.; see also Cesarini v. United States, 296 F. Supp. 3, 4-7
(N.D. Ohio 1969) (holding that money found hidden in used piano was gross income and thus
subject to taxation), aff'd, 428 F.2d 812, 814 (6th Cir. 1970).
It is this author's opinion that the windfall analysis will, in most cases, provide the IRS with
its best chance for subjecting such property to income taxation.
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able to claim a deduction for claims that are asserted or assertable against
the estate, failure to comply with the terms of § 2053 or the public policy
doctrine could often stand in the way of such an effort. Moreover, existing
case law renders the casualty loss deduction of the estate tax inapplicable to
forfeitures of the fruits of crime.
The proper treatment under the estate tax of the products of criminal
activity is an issue that has received scant attention until recently. Yet,
given the likely future growth in criminal enterprises, particularly in the
area of trafficking in controlled substances, one can expect to see greater
application of the estate tax to the fruits of crime.
